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riving under the influence of intoxicants 
(DUII) is defined as operating a vehicle under 
the influence of any substance that can impair 
driving performance. In the ten year period from 1996-
2005, there were 122 motor vehicle, 49 pedestrian, and 
9 bicycle alcohol-related fatalities in Portland, Oregon. 
Over the same period, there were 1,734 reported 
alcohol-involved injury crashes, many of these life-
altering and painful. Using conservative estimates from 
the National Safety Council, the City of Portland 
estimates the economic value of these crashes is 
approximately $767 million. This value does not include 
the significant public cost to deal with prevention, 
enforcement, and adjudication of alcohol-involved 
offenders.    
The trend in U.S. alcohol-related motor vehicle 
crashes was generally decreasing in the mid to late 
1980’s but has remained fairly flat since the early 
1990s.  In 1982, approximately 60% of all US traffic 
fatalities were alcohol-related. By 1994, this had 
decreased to 43% but in the decade that followed it has 
changed little. In 2005, nearly 39% of fatal crashes still 
involved alcohol.  This contrasts sharply with the trends 
in many other peer industrialized countries (such as 
Australia) which has seen a 60% drop in the total 
number of fatal alcohol-involved crashes since 1980.  In 
most U.S. jurisdictions, the trend for alcohol-involved 
crashes mirrors the disappointing national trends and in 
some has even been slightly increasing. 
The reasons for these trends are many but can 
be found in changing demographics, reduced resources 
for enforcement, prosecution, and treatment as well as 
changing public behaviors and attitudes. Nationally and 
locally there is a strong desire to reduce the societal 
impacts of this significant social problem. The objective 
of this study was to identify tools, techniques and 
strategies that could help reverse this trend for the 
Portland metropolitan area. It is clear that the system to 
prevent, enforce, adjudicate, and treat alcohol-related 
problems is complex and will require the cooperation 
and energy of many different stakeholders to make 
meaningful improvements.  
State of the Problem 
No single statistic can completely explain the problem, 
impacts, or trends of driving under the influence of 
intoxicants. This report attempted to present as many 
metrics as could reasonably be assembled. Compared 
with much of the nation, Oregon’s current metrics on 
alcohol-involved crashes are generally below average 
(as are many other traffic safety-related metrics). In 
2005, Oregon ranked 35th by percent of total motor-
vehicle fatalities that are alcohol-involved and 32nd in 
alcohol-involved fatalities per 100,000 persons.  In 
Multnomah County, there were 2.60 alcohol-related 
fatalities per 100,000 persons which is well below the 
national average rate of 5.69.  In contrast, nearly 46 
percent of all fatalities involved alcohol which is above 
the national average of 39 percent. 
To better understand the how DUII related-
offenses are handled in the Portland and Multnomah 
County region, the research team conducted targeted 
interviews of stakeholders. The team interviewed 
representatives from Oregon Liquor Control 
Commission, Oregon Restaurant Association, Portland 
Department of Transportation, Trauma Nurses Talk 
Tough, Portland Police Bureau, Ride On Portland, 
Multnomah County District Attorney, Multnomah 
County District Court, Multnomah County DUII 
Intensive Supervision Program, Multnomah County 
Treatment Providers, and others. The results of these 
interviews were compiled with existing literature to 
document the current practices. 
Analysis of data and information gathered during 
the interviews suggest the following: 
 
• Alcohol-involved crashes are more severe. While 
fatal crashes account for less than 3% of total 
reported crashes, nearly 30% of alcohol-involved 
crashes that are fatal. Not surprisingly, speed and 
alcohol crashes are often related. 
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• Younger drivers, particularly male, are a risk group 
for alcohol-involved crashes. The 21-30 age cohort 
is overrepresented in alcohol-involved crashes 
compared to the general population.  Males are 
almost 2 times more likely than females to be 
involved in a crash and about 3 times more likely 
than females to be involved in a fatal alcohol-
involved crash. 
• The majority of people fatally injured an alcohol-
involved crash had not been drinking. 
Approximately 60% of all participants fatally 
injured in an alcohol-involved crash had a BAC of 
0.00. 
• Most drivers arrested for DUII are well above the 
0.08 blood alcohol concentration that is the per se 
legal limit in Oregon. The average BAC of those 
arrested in Portland is approximately 0.15 g/dl. 
• As one might expect, the majority of fatal alcohol-
involved crashes occur during the weekend late 
night and early morning hours, with Friday and 
Saturday being the most common. There was also a 
small peak noted late Wednesday night and early 
Thursday morning. 
• The average time required for the Portland Police 
Bureau to process a DUII arrest is approximately 2 
hours - taking away valuable police presence. 
Given that 2,194 arrests were made in 2005 this 
processing time is nearly equal to 2 officers 
working full-time for a year just to process DUII 
offenders. 
• Nearly 3,500 DUII arrests (offenses) are made 
every year in Multnomah County. This is 
approximately 51.07 offenses per 10,000 people 
(lower that the statewide rate of 70.26). However, 
enforcement activity measures as the rate of fatal 
alcohol-involved crashes per arrests was 150 - the 
lowest of the three metro counties. 
• Nearly all first-time offenders are sent to diversion 
and court-ordered treatment. The completion rate 
for those that have been sent to treatment program 
via diversion is approximately 65%.  
• Of those arrested and not eligible for diversion, 
there are approximately 1,600 to 1,300 convictions 
per year.  The majority of these convictions have 
been for a first DUII (not counting diversion), 
however, about one third of all convictions have 





A comprehensive literature review was conducted to 
identify best practices which have been found to be an 
effective means of reducing impaired driving. These 
best practices are organized into four focus areas: 
prevention, enforcement, adjudication, and treatment. It 
is clear that modifications that improve or modify one 
focus area will have impacts in another. For example, an 
increase in enforcement activities will require more 
court resources and presumably more treatment 
resources to process these additional persons. 
 
The review found the following promising best 
practices: 
 
• Targeted marketing of the impacts and issues of 
intoxicated driving is more effective that traditional 
general public service announcements which have 
not been shown to noticeably change behavior.  
• Controlling access to alcohol can be effective since 
nearly 40% of all impaired driving incidents begin 
in a licensed establishment. Judiciously managing 
the number of licenses and establishments, as well 
cooperative efforts to reward well-managed 
establishments may be a way to reduce impaired 
driving.  Excise taxes, particularly on beer, have 
also been shown to have a reduce alcohol sales and 
consumption. 
• Zero-tolerance laws for underage drivers can be 
effective. Minimum legal drinking age laws and 
zero tolerance laws were enacted in the 1970s and 
1980s, respectively.  These laws have been 
extensively evaluated and have shown reductions in 
alcohol-involved crashes. 
• Well-funded and strategic enforcement is key 
ingredient to the long-term success of combating 










dedicated DUII officers have made a significant 
impact on impaired driving.  Saturation patrols 
coupled with media coverage have also been 
effective. 
• Ignition interlocks – devices which require the 
driver to pass a breath test prior to starting the 
vehicle and at random intervals – can be effective at 
targeting repeat offenders.  Ignition interlocks have 
been shown to reduce violations when compared to 
a control group and reduce crashes. Electronic 
monitoring and house arrest are used in many states 
as a way to free up jail space and allow offenders to 
reduce recidivism rates. 
• Intensive supervision programs have been proven 
to be somewhat cost effective (varying research 
results), but effective in reducing recidivism rates 
by 12% in two years after the start of treatment.  
ISP program usually only have the resources to 
handle the most severe cases are handled.  ISP 
program has been known to be effective in 
contributing to community service, helping 
offenders find jobs with usually higher paying 
annual salaries, and freeing up some jail space. 
• Treatment programs have been known to be 
effective in reducing recidivism rates.  Research 
indicates treatment programs that are tailored to the 
individual where the individual has one point of 
contact have been observed to be more effective in 
reducing recidivism. 
• Up to 50% of all ER trauma patients have been 
found to have some alcohol problem.  In many 
trauma centers, motivational interviews are 
conducted when a patient is released from the 
hospital and followed up 30 days, to a year later.  
These interviews have resulted in a reduction in 
future hospital emergency room visits.  In addition, 
patients who were surveyed reported their alcohol 
use was reduced compared to a control group. 
Recommendations 
Based on the data, review of best practices, and 
stakeholder interviews a matrix was developed to assist 
the DUII Working Group in determining a suitable set 
of strategies for reducing the impact of driving under 
the influence of intoxicants (drugs and alcohol).  For 
each possible strategy, a cost and effectiveness rank of 
low, medium, or high was assigned.  The effectiveness 
ranking was based on the potential to reduce alcohol-
related crashes. The working group then conducted a 
voting process over the course of two meetings. The 
following strategies are recommended: 
• Re-explore possibility of using pseudo-checkpoints 
or saturation patrols coupled with intensive media 
coverage to raise awareness of DUI enforcement. 
• Obtain support from Portland Police Bureau upper 
management for increased enforcement, especially 
on nights and weekends. 
• For qualified low-income clients, increase funding 
available for treatment services. 
• Engage DUII working group to work with juvenile 
system to identify areas where the group can work 
to improve the current situation. 
• Work to find ways to increase funding for the 
highly successful DISP program to expand program 
services to help reduce chronic repeat offenders.  
• Work with court system to advocate for ways to 
enhance efficiency. 
• Provide alternative transportation options from 
drinking establishment for impaired drivers using 
programs such as RideOn Portland and-or 
increasing transit options. These efforts should be 
coupled with a strong, effective marketing 
campaign. 
• Deliver education campaigns in a more appealing 
manner (social marketing) particularly highlighting 
minors and other key groups.  
• Work to increase the use of ignition interlocks as 
sanctions. 
• Encourage consistent application of motivational 
interviews for hospital patients upon discharge. 
• Continue DUII Working Group efforts and build 
relationship with Governor's Council on Alcohol 
and Drug Abuse Program 
Next Steps 
The DUII Working Group should select a number of 
items for targeted efforts from the above priority list and 
help expand these ideas. The Community and School 
Traffic Safety Partnership should be encouraged to 
develop and write grants to ODOTs Transportation 




In the United States, there were approximately 42,000 highway-related fatalities in 2003 and 
nearly forty percent of these crashes occurred in cities (NHTSA, 2003). Nationally, nearly 36 
percent of these crashes involved the presence of alcohol or other intoxicants.    Perhaps even 
more tragic is that nearly 60 percent of those fatally-injured in an alcohol-involved crash 
were not the intoxicated participant.  These preventable crashes inflict a significant toll on 
society which extends beyond those fatally injured in these crashes.  Injuries, especially life 
changing ones, can be just as tragic and catastrophic.   
The trend in U.S. alcohol-related motor vehicle crashes was generally decreasing in the mid 
to late 1980’s but has remained fairly flat since the early 1990s.  In 1982, approximately 60% 
of all US traffic fatalities were alcohol-related. By 1994, this had decreased to 43% but in the 
decade that followed it has changed little. In 2005, nearly 39% of fatal crashes still involved 
alcohol.  This contrasts sharply with the trends in many other peer industrialized countries 
such as Australia which has seen a 60% drop in the total number of fatal alcohol-involved 
crashes since 1980.  In most U.S. jurisdictions, the trend for alcohol-involved crashes mirrors 
the disappointing national trends and in some has even been slightly increasing.  The reasons 
for these trends are many but can be found in changing demographics, reduced resources for 
enforcement, prosecution, and treatment as well as changing public behaviors and attitudes. 
The objective of this study was to identify tools, techniques and strategies that could help 
reverse this trend for the Portland metropolitan area. It is clear that the system to prevent, 
enforce, adjudicate, and treat alcohol-related problems is complex and will require the 
cooperation and energy of many different stakeholders. Public views about the social 
acceptability of drinking and driving in Oregon have also recently declined slightly. In 2002 
about 93% of those surveyed for ODOT Traffic Safety Attitude Survey said that drinking and 
driving was a socially unacceptable behavior. In 2005, only 90% percent of those answered 
positively.  
Compared with much of the nation, Oregon’s current status on alcohol-involved crashes is 
below average (as are many other traffic-safety related metrics). In 2005, Oregon ranked 35th 
by percent of total alcohol-involved fatalities motor vehicle fatalities and 32nd in alcohol-
involved fatalities per 100,000 persons.  In Multnomah County, the 2.60 alcohol-related 
fatalities per 100,000 persons rate is well below the national average of 5.69.  However, it is 
clear that despite these positive national comparisons there exists an opportunity to make 
significant improvements reducing alcohol-involved crashes. In the ten year period from 
1996-2005, there were 122 motor vehicle, 49 pedestrian, and 9 bicycle alcohol-related 
fatalities. There were 1,734 reported injury alcohol-involved crashes over the same period, 
many of these life-altering and painful. Using conservative estimates from the National 
Safety Council, the City of Portland estimates the economic value of these crashes is 
approximately $767 million (PDOT, 2006). This value does not include the significant public 
cost to deal with prevention, enforcement, and adjudication of alcohol-involved offenders.  
While no single statistic can completely explain the problem or trends of driving under the 
influence of intoxicants these data to motivate the desire to reduce the societal impacts of this 
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significant social problem.  The system to prevent, enforce, and treat alcohol-related 
problems is complex and involves many different agents.  In fact, the problem is so wide-
scoping that the complexity itself presents a challenge to improvement.  There is a depth of 
published research on many facets of this problem.  This report has attempted to define the 
state of the problem in the City of Portland, document the current process for dealing with 
offenders, and identify potential strategies that could be pursued for improvement.  
1.1.1 Purpose of Report 
In 2005, members on the Community and School Traffic Safety Partnership DUII Working 
Group identified a need to become more familiar with national best practices to reduce 
impaired driving.  The contents of this report are meant to provide useful quantitative and 
qualitative information to the DUII Working Group so they can evaluate their current 
impaired driving initiatives and determine a suitable improvement implementation strategy to 
further reduce the occurrence of impaired driving.    
1.1.2 Scope of the Analysis 
The impairment resulting from drugs (both illegal and prescription) are an important and 
growing concern related to this problem but they are not covered in detail in this report. This 
is partly due to the greater amount of literature and data on alcohol abuse.  However, research 
has shown a strong link between alcohol abuse and other substances so a majority of the 
strategies, trend analysis, data, and analysis are still very relevant.  
1.1.3 Organization of Report 
This report is organized into five main sections following this brief introduction.  Chapter 2 
includes an analysis of crash data at the federal, state, county, and city level.  Chapter 3 
documents current efforts in the City of Portland and Multnomah County to reduce impaired 
driving.  Chapter 4 summarizes national best practices which were supported by significant 
quantitative or qualitative analysis in the literature.  Chapter 5 combines the results of all 
three chapters to develop specific strategies for the working group to consider. These 
strategies are defined and categorized based on cost and expected effectiveness.  Finally, 
Chapter 6 presents the prioritized strategies forwarded by the DUII Working Group.   
3 
 
2.0 STATE OF THE PROBLEM 
Driving under the influence of intoxicants (DUII) applies to any substance that can impair 
driving performance.  However, because a greater amount of literature and collected data 
exists on alcohol use, the emphasis in this chapter (and report) is typically placed on impaired 
driving due to alcohol use.  It should be noted however that the use of other intoxicants 
(illegal drugs such as methamphetamines and legal prescription drugs) are of increasing 
concern and that research shows that there is a strong link between addictive users of alcohol 
and other drugs.  
This chapter begins with a summary of alcohol-involved crash data trends.  The chapter 
continues with a more detailed analysis of crash data, enforcement and other issues such as 
minors in possession program, court activities, treatment programs. Where possible, data are 
summarized at the national (United States), state (Oregon urban areas), county (Multnomah 
County), and city level (City of Portland). International trends (European Union and 
Australia) are also included wherever applicable to provide a more expansive comparison of 
alcohol-involved crash trends.   
2.1 METHODOLOGY 
A performance metric commonly used to quantify the problem of impaired driving is motor-
vehicle crashes.  The use of crash data are emphasized in this report because it is available at 
the federal, state, county, and city level and collected using similar reporting procedures.  
However, crash-related data can only describe a portion of the problem related to enforcing, 
prosecuting, and treating those involved in alcohol-related motor vehicle crashes. As such 
other sources relating to enforcement, prosecuting, and treatment data are presented where 
available.   
2.1.1 Data Sources 
Several data sources were used in the analysis of federal, state, county and city level alcohol-
involved crashes. The sources include: 
• National Highway Transportation Safety Administration’s (NHTSA) Fatality 
Analysis Reporting System (FARS);  
• Oregon Department of Transportation (ODOT) Statewide Crash Data System (CDS); 
• U.S. Census Bureau; 
• Oregon Liquor Control Commission (OLCC); 
• Portland Police Bureau (PPB);  
• Oregon State Police Law Enforcement Data System (LEDS);  
• Oregon Judicial Information Network (OJIN);  
• Multnomah County Alcohol and Drug Evaluation Program;  
• Multnomah County District Attorney’s Office; 
• DUII Intensive Supervision Program (DISP); 
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• Legacy Emanuel Hospital Trauma Services; 
• Trauma Nurses Talk Tough; and 




The Oregon Department of Transportation (ODOT) Statewide Crash Data System (CDS); 
defines an alcohol-involved crash as those crashes where at least one active participant (a 
driver, pedestrian, or pedalcyclist) in a position of control during the crash, used alcohol as 
indicated by a police report or had a positive BAC test result (measurable or estimated blood 
alcohol concentration (BAC) of  0.01 grams per deciliter (g/dl) or above) as indicated by any 
police report, crime lab report, or medical examiner toxicology report (ODOT, 2006).  
The National Highway Transportation Safety Administration’s (NHTSA) Fatality Analysis 
Reporting System (FARS) defines an alcohol-related or alcohol-involved crash as “a crash 
where "either a driver or a non-motorist (usually a pedestrian) had a measurable or estimated 
blood alcohol concentration (BAC) of 0.01 grams per deciliter (g/dl) or above.  NHTSA 
defines a nonfatal crash as alcohol-related or alcohol-involved if police indicate on the police 
accident report that there is evidence of alcohol present.  The code does not necessarily mean 
that a driver or non-occupant was tested for alcohol” (FARS, 2008). 
2.2 ALCOHOL-INVOLVED CRASH TRENDS 
This section begins with an overview of the number and percentage of alcohol-involved 
crashes from 1995 – 2004 nationally (United States), internationally, and Oregon (statewide 
and urban areas), Multnomah County, and the City of Portland.  Fatal and injury, or non-
fatal, crashes are analyzed.  Concluding this section is a more in depth analysis of the crash 
data by the causes and contributing factors of the fatal and injury only alcohol-involved 
crashes.   
2.2.1 National Trends 
The trends in both the number and percent of total fatalities that are alcohol-related has 
remained relatively flat since the early 1990s in the United States as shown in Figure 1.  In 
1982, 59.6% of all US traffic fatalities were alcohol related. This has dropped to 42.5% by 
1994.  Ten years later it has changed little and approximately 39.5% of fatal crashes involved 
alcohol. Looking at state-level performance reveals that there are significant differences 
among states as shown in Table 1.  In terms of percentage of total crashes for 2005, the 
District of Columbia had the worst record with nearly 55% of the total crashes related to 
alcohol.  Oregon ranked 35th with 36% of total motor-vehicle fatalities that were alcohol-
involved.  While all metrics expressed as a rate must be interpreted with caution, the worst 
state was Montana with nearly 13.27 fatalities per 100,000 persons.  Oregon ranked 32nd in 
fatalities with 4.86 per 100,000 persons. 
The same data in Table 1 are presented for five years in Table 2 for Oregon counties.  It is 
clear that there is also a significant difference between Oregon counties.  As shown in Table 
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2, Multnomah County was above the national average for percent of fatalities (46%) that 
were alcohol-involved. However, on a per population basis Multnomah County is well below 
average.  Figure 2 shows thematic maps of a) average county fatality rate per 100,000 
population and b) average percent of total alcohol-involved fatalities. The total alcohol 
fatalities over the 5 years are shown in the scaled-bubbles. In both maps, light colors (green) 
indicate better performance. Benton, Grant, Union, and Yamhill counties are in the best 
performance category for both metrics. However, both the average populations and total 
crashes are well below that of Multnomah county. Of the tri-county metropolitan areas 






















Alabama 1,131 423 37 29 4,548,327 9.30 7 
Alaska 72 35 48 6 663,253 5.28 27 
Arizona 1,177 492 42 14 5,953,007 8.26 13 
Arkansas 648 233 36 35 2,775,708 8.39 11 
California 4,329 1719 40 19 36,154,147 4.75 33 
Colorado 606 244 40 19 4,663,295 5.23 28 
Connecticut 274 120 44 11 3,500,701 3.43 47 
Delaware 134 66 49 4 841,741 7.84 15 
DC 48 26 55 1 582,049 4.47 40 
Florida 3,543 1471 42 14 17,768,191 8.28 12 
Georgia 1,729 545 32 47 9,132,553 5.97 24 
Hawaii 140 71 51 2 1,273,278 5.58 25 
Idaho 275 89 32 47 1,429,367 6.23 23 
Illinois 1,361 580 43 12 12,765,427 4.54 38 
Indiana 938 320 34 44 6,266,019 5.11 31 
Iowa 450 118 26 50 2,965,524 3.98 45 
Kansas 428 151 35 40 2,748,172 5.49 26 
Kentucky 985 313 32 47 4,172,608 7.50 17 
Louisiana 955 394 41 17 4,507,331 8.74 10 
Maine 169 59 35 40 1,318,220 4.48 39 
Maryland 614 235 38 26 5,589,599 4.20 42 
Massachusetts 442 171 39 23 6,433,367 2.66 50 
Michigan 1,129 421 37 29 10,100,833 4.17 43 
Minnesota 559 201 36 35 5,126,739 3.92 46 
Mississippi 931 371 40 19 2,908,496 12.76 3 
Missouri 1,257 515 41 17 5,797,703 8.88 9 
Montana 251 124 49 4 934,737 13.27 1 
Nebraska 276 91 33 46 1,758,163 5.18 29 
Nevada 427 159 37 29 2,412,301 6.59 21 
New Hampshire 166 60 36 35 1,306,819 4.59 36 
New Jersey 748 263 35 40 8,703,150 3.02 48 
New Mexico 488 189 39 23 1,925,985 9.81 6 
New York 1,429 524 37 29 19,315,721 2.71 49 
North Carolina 1,534 549 36 35 8,672,459 6.33 22 
North Dakota 123 58 47 7 634,605 9.14 8 
Ohio 1,323 505 38 26 11,470,685 4.40 41 
Oklahoma 802 283 35 40 3,543,442 7.99 14 
Oregon 488 177 36 35 3,638,871 4.86 32 
Pennsylvania 1,616 636 39 23 12,405,348 5.13 30 
Rhode Island 87 43 50 3 1,073,579 4.01 44 
South Carolina 1,093 464 42 14 4,246,933 10.93 4 
South Dakota 186 80 43 12 774,883 10.32 5 
Tennessee 1,270 464 37 29 5,955,745 7.79 16 
Texas 3,504 1569 45 8 22,928,508 6.84 19 
Utah 282 37 13 51 2,490,334 1.49 51 
Vermont 73 29 40 19 622,387 4.66 35 
Virginia 947 347 37 29 7,564,327 4.59 37 
Washington 647 294 45 8 6,291,899 4.67 34 
West Virginia 374 126 34 44 1,814,083 6.95 18 
Wisconsin 815 369 45 8 5,527,644 6.68 20 
Wyoming 170 65 38 26 508,798 12.78 2 


























































Baker    16,600  0 1 2 0 3 6 2 4 8 4 4 11 36.36 12.08 12 8 
Benton    80,400  1 2 1 1 2 2 10 5 10 4 5 4 23.68 1.86 31 35 
Clackamas   350,900  24 17 12 12 8 16 42 34 32 40 23 41 41.98 4.25 9 28 
Clatsop    36,200  3 3 1 1 2 4 8 14 5 3 9 12 27.45 6.45 30 17 
Columbia    44,900  2 4 4 1 3 2 2 15 5 3 4 9 42.11 5.95 8 21 
Coos    62,800  2 4 5 7 3 3 12 11 10 15 14 10 33.33 6.37 20 18 
Crook    20,500  0 0 2 1 0 1 8 2 4 5 2 4 16.00 3.20 34 30 
Curry    21,200  0 1 0 4 2 0 2 1 4 6 4 0 41.18 5.51 10 23 
Deschutes   128,900  6 8 6 8 3 6 15 19 16 22 17 19 34.26 4.84 18 26 
Douglas   101,700  12 9 6 9 15 10 32 27 24 26 29 31 36.09 10.00 15 10 
Gilliam      1,900  1 0 0 1 3 0 2 0 0 2 3 4 45.45 43.79 3 2 
Grant      7,800  1 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 1 2 4 0 9.09 2.10 36 33 
Harney      7,600  3 6 0 0 2 0 8 10 3 5 3 5 32.35 24.09 22 5 
Hood River    20,700  0 1 0 3 6 1 2 4 3 4 7 3 47.83 8.79 1 11 
Jackson   188,100  5 11 10 16 23 13 21 27 20 28 44 32 45.35 6.87 4 15 
Jefferson    19,800  5 4 4 9 5 5 14 8 12 14 7 14 46.38 26.88 2 4 
Josephine    77,800  4 7 5 9 3 6 17 18 10 20 17 13 35.79 7.28 17 14 
Klamath    64,500  7 7 10 5 15 4 13 20 22 20 23 24 39.34 12.40 11 7 
Lake      7,500  1 4 1 0 0 0 5 8 9 0 2 4 21.43 13.37 32 6 
Lane   329,300  20 11 13 11 9 12 50 43 32 46 37 35 31.28 3.86 24 29 
Lincoln    44,600  7 2 2 2 1 4 10 13 16 10 5 11 27.69 6.73 29 16 
Linn   104,800  8 6 5 6 8 6 17 21 14 27 18 27 31.45 6.20 23 20 
Malheur    31,900  1 1 2 9 0 2 5 5 6 17 6 9 31.25 7.83 25 13 
Marion   293,500  25 10 11 14 20 12 43 37 28 36 37 34 42.79 5.24 6 24 
Morrow    11,500  1 0 1 2 0 0 3 2 3 2 1 0 36.36 5.83 12 22 
Multnomah   675,600  14 22 16 24 23 16 33 48 46 56 46 40 42.75 2.84 7 31 
Polk    64,000  2 3 3 7 5 4 10 9 10 17 11 10 35.82 6.23 16 19 
Sherman      1,900    0 1 3 2 1 3 1 8 7 2 3 29.17 61.73 28 1 
Tillamook    24,800  0 1 3 5 5 3 2 13 10 9 12 12 29.31 11.38 27 9 
Umatilla    71,400  2 4 6 2 4 3 8 12 10 11 11 10 33.87 4.90 19 25 
Union    24,700  0 0 2 2 0 0 2 5 3 6 5 0 19.05 2.71 33 32 
Wallowa      7,200  1  0 0  0 0 1 2 1 0 0 2 1 33.33 4.64 20 27 
Wasco    23,800  3 4 2 1 1 1 3 7 6 9 3 5 36.36 8.37 12 12 
Washington   467,800  11 9 5 6 10 15 33 34 36 27 31 30 29.32 1.99 26 34 
Wheeler      1,500    1   1   1 0 1 0 3 1 2 42.86 32.27 5 3 
Yamhill    87,800  1 1 2 2 1 2 10 6 10 6 7 19 15.52 1.70 35 36 





A – Average Alcohol-Involved Fatalities per 100,000 Population, 2000-2005 
 
B – Average Percent of Total Alcohol-Involved Fatalities (Total Alcohol Fatalities in Bubbles), 2000-
2005 
 
Figure 2: Oregon Alcohol-Involved Fatalities Metric, 2000-2005 
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2.2.2 International Trends 
Direct comparison of alcohol-related crash trends across countries is challenging because of 
different definitions and reporting procedures. However, some comparison is possible if data 
are normalized.  Where data were available, comparisons of US trends to peer industrialized 
countries were made. Figure 3a indicates the total number of fatal alcohol-involved crashes 
per 100,000 persons based on the total population of each western industrialized country.  
The rate in the United States exceeds all other countries in numbers of fatal alcohol-involved 
crashes per 100,000 persons.  Figure 3b shows the percentage change since the first recording 
year of fatal alcohol-involved crashes in each western industrialized country.  These figures 
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B - Percent Change Since First Data Year in Total Number of Fatal Alcohol-Involved Crashes 
 





2.2.3 Oregon Trends 
Fatal alcohol-involved crash trends for Oregon urban areas, Multnomah County and the City 
of Portland are displayed in Figure 4, 5 and 6.  In Figure 4, the percent of total fatal crashes 
that are alcohol-involved crashes is shown.  Overall, in all three jurisdictions, the percent of 
total fatal crashes that are alcohol-involved crashes fluctuates, increasing in the late 1990s, 
decreasing in the 2001, and increasing again in 2003.  The ten year trend for the three 
jurisdictions indicates the average percent of total fatal crashes that are alcohol-involved 
crashes is approximately 40% or 46, 20, and 15 crashes per year for the three jurisdictions, 
respectively.  
Figure 5 and 6 displays the total number per 100,000 persons and percent change since 1995 
of fatal alcohol-involved crashes.  In Figure 5, the trend in total number of fatal alcohol-
involved crashes per 100,000 persons matches the declining trend for western industrialized 
countries (Figure 3A) with the exception of an increase starting 1995 and 2003.  Figure 6 
displays the percent change since 1995 in total number of fatal alcohol-involved crashes for 
Oregon urban areas, Multnomah County, and the City of Portland.  In all three jurisdictions, 
the trend in percent change in total number of fatal alcohol-involved crashes rises starting 
1995, declines starting 1998, and rises again in 2002.  
Data from all Oregon urban areas are contrasted to Multnomah County and the City of 
Portland in Figure 7, 8 and 9.  The ten year trend for total percent share of injury only crashes 
that are alcohol-involved is displayed in Figure 7.  The percent share of injury only crashes 
that are alcohol-involved holds steady at approximately 2%, or approximately 280, 111, and 
92 crashes, respectively, for the three jurisdictional areas. To put the problem in perspective 
with respect to the population, Figure 8 indicates the total number of injury only alcohol-
involved crashes remains at about 10 to 20 crashes per 100,000 persons with the exception of 
30-40 crashes in 1996.   
Figure 9 shows the percent change in total number of injury only alcohol-involved crashes 
since 1995.  With the exception of a spike in 1996 and 2003, the percent change since 1995 
in total number of injury only alcohol-involved crashes has remained relatively the same at 
about a 20% decrease in total number of alcohol-involved crashes since 1995.  Compared to 
the percent change in total number of fatal alcohol-involved crashes since 1995 (Figure 7), 
the rate for injuries shows decreases while the rate for fatalities shows increases since 1995. 




Figure 4: Percent Share of All Fatal Crashes that are Alcohol-Involved 
 
Figure 5: Total Number of Fatal Alcohol-Involved Crashes per 100,000 Persons 
 




Figure 7: Percentage Share of All Injury Crashes that are Alcohol-Involved 
 
 
Figure 8: Total Number of Injury Alcohol-Involved Crashes per 100,000 Persons 
 




2.3 CRASH ANALYSIS 
2.3.1 Severity 
Crash data in the United States is typically categorized in three crash severity types. These 
severity types, in decreasing order of severity, include fatal, injury only, and property 
damage only.  In this section, crash severity data are presented on the crash severity types for 
all crashes and alcohol-involved crashes.  
Figure 10 and 11 show the breakdown of the crash severity types in Oregon urban areas, 
Multnomah County, and the City of Portland.  It is clear from comparing the distribution of 
crashes by crash severity between the two figures that alcohol-involved crashes are typically 
more severe.  As shown in Figure 10, the share of all crashes that is fatal is approximately 
0.34%, 0.37%, and 0.32% respectively in Oregon urban areas, Multnomah County, and City 
of Portland.  However, for alcohol-involved crashes as shown in Figure 11, the share of all 
alcohol-involved crashes that is fatal is 8.99%, 9.32%, and 8.88% respectively for the same 







































































Fatal Injury Property Damage Only
Source: ODOT
 




2.3.2 Causes and Contributing Factors of Crashes  
Causes and contributing factors of fatal and injury only alcohol-involved crashes include 
driver error and collision type variables for impaired drivers.  Figures 12-17 displays the 
percentage of all drivers in a fatal and injury only alcohol-involved crash by impaired driver 
error and collision type in Oregon urban areas, Multnomah County, and the City of Portland.  
Data in these figures display the most frequently occurring driver errors.  The total number of 
impaired drivers and those excluded from the figures (those driver errors with low frequency 
percentages), are noted in the figures.  
Impaired driver data were used for the analysis because they are typically the drivers who are 
the striking vehicle in an alcohol-involved crash and are the group of concern.  Because the 
impaired drivers are those only with a positive BAC level (as indicated in the ODOT CDS), 
the total number of drivers is much less than total number of drivers involved in an alcohol-
involved crash or total number of alcohol-involved crashes. The data presented in this section 
will only indicate the possible causes of alcohol-involved crashes from the perspective of 
impaired drivers with positive BAC levels.  
Figure 12, 14, and 16 display the percentage of impaired drivers in a fatal and injury only 
alcohol-involved crash by driver error for Oregon urban areas, Multnomah County, and the 
City of Portland.  The trends for the three jurisdictional areas are similar.  Not surprisingly, 
speed and alcohol-involved crashes are closely associated, For fatal alcohol-involved crashes, 
“BASCRULE”, or driving too fast for conditions, is the most frequent contributing cause for 
close to 50% of all driver errors.  This is followed by a related driver error, speed, of 
approximately 10% of all driver errors.  For injury only alcohol-involved crashes, 
“BASCRULE” also is the most frequent contributing cause of 24% to 30% of all driver 
errors.  The second most frequent impaired driver error for fatal alcohol-involved crashes is 
rear-ending crashes of approximately 18% in all three jurisdictions.  
Figure 13, 15, and 17 display the percentage of drivers in a fatal and injury only alcohol-
involved crash by collision type in Oregon urban areas, Multnomah County, and the City of 
Portland.  For fatal alcohol-involved crashes, the most frequent collision type is hitting a 
fixed object of approximately 50% in all three jurisdictions.  For injury only alcohol-involved 
crashes, the most frequent collision type is rear-ending of up to 30%, followed closely by 
hitting a fixed object of just over approximately 20%, and turning or angle collision of 
approximately 15%.  The collision types are more uniformly distributed among turning and 
angle collision crashes in the City of Portland and Multnomah County than in Oregon urban 




















Figure 12: Oregon Urban Areas - Percentage of Impaired Drivers in an Alcohol-Involved Crash by 





















































Figure 13: Oregon Urban Areas - Percentage of Impaired Drivers in an Alcohol-Involved Crash by 
Collision Type, 1995-2004 (Fatal Crashes -> Total Impaired Drivers = 258, Injury Only Crashes -> Total 




















Figure 14: Multnomah County - Percentage of Impaired Drivers in an Alcohol-Involved Crash by Driver 


















































Figure 15: Multnomah County - Percentage of Impaired Drivers in an Alcohol-Involved Crash by 
Collision Type, 1995-2004 (Fatal Crashes -> Total Impaired Drivers = 113, Injury Only Crashes -> Total 



















Figure 16: City of Portland - Percentage of Impaired Drivers in an Alcohol-Involved Crash by Driver 

















































Figure 17: City of Portland - Percentage of Impaired Drivers in an Alcohol-Involved Crash by Collision 
Type, 1995-2004 (Fatal Crashes -> Total Impaired Drivers = 89, Injury Only Crashes -> Total Impaired 




2.3.3 Analysis of the Impaired Driver 
Figure 18 displays the percentage of impaired drivers by age cohort in a fatal alcohol 
involved crash in Oregon urban areas, Multnomah County, and City of Portland.  In Figure 
19, a histogram of the total population that is over age 15 by age group is shown. It is clear 
from the figures that the age cohort with the highest percentage of impaired drivers involved 
in a fatal alcohol-involved crash is the 21-25 age cohort. This cohort is involved in 
approximately 22% of fatal alcohol crashes, yet represents less than 9% of the population.  
The 26-30 age group is similarly overrepresented.   
Figure 20 and 21 displays the total number of impaired drivers in fatal alcohol-involved 
crashes by gender.  The analysis was conducted using FARS data.  The total number of 
impaired drivers in the United States and Oregon statewide per year is approximately 56,500 
and 640, respectively.  The percentage of all impaired drivers in the United States and 
Oregon statewide, impaired drivers involved in a fatal alcohol-involved crash who are male 
is approximately 70%.  Females comprise only approximately 25% or approximately 15,000 
and 150 impaired drivers, respectively, of all impaired drivers in fatal alcohol-involved 
crashes.  There are almost three times more impaired drivers who are males than females 
involved in a fatal alcohol-involved crash.  
ODOT data were used to calculate the percent of impaired drivers in a fatal alcohol-involved 
crash by gender in Figure 22.  The total number of impaired drivers for Oregon urban areas, 
Multnomah County, and City of Portland was 258, 113, and 89 impaired drivers from 1995-
2004.  The percentage of impaired drivers in an alcohol-involved crash that is male is a little 
above 80% for the three jurisdictional areas. This is approximately 10% more than the 
percentage of males at the statewide and national level and they are clearly overrepresented.   
 
Data analysis was not conducted for age at the national and international levels. The driving 
history of offenders, or impaired drivers, including the status of the impaired driver’s license 
and how often they were arrested with a suspended were not easily available to conduct an 
analysis of impaired drivers by license status or other measures.  These data are available but 
































































































OR Urban Areas Multnomah County City of Portland
Source: ODOT
 
Figure 18: Percentage of Impaired Drivers in a Fatal Alcohol-Involved Crash by Age Group – Oregon 





















































































































Source: FARS  











































Source: FARS  














































Figure 22: Percent of Impaired Drivers in a Fatal Alcohol-Involved Crash by Gender - Oregon Urban 
Areas, Multnomah County, and City of Portland, 1995-2004  
 
 
2.3.4 Analysis of All Crash Participants 
An analysis of all participants involved in a crash (e.g. all drivers and passengers) was 
conducted.  International and nationwide data were not available for this analysis because 
participant demographics for all crashes were considered, not just fatal crashes.  In the 
participant analysis by race and ethnicity, nationwide data were available.  However, the 
analysis for race and ethnicity was conducted for fatal crashes only, since the data were taken 
from NTHSA FARS data.  While race and ethnicity data were available in participant level 
data from ODOT, it was not used in this analysis because the field for race / ethnicity was not 
available for participants.   
Figure 23 and 24 displays the percentage of persons fatally injured in fatal alcohol-involved 
crashes by the highest BAC level recorded from an impaired participant, which includes 
drivers, passengers, pedestrians, and cyclists.  If a person did not drink, his or her BAC level 
was marked as 0.00.  Figure 23 shows percent makeup of persons fatally injured by highest 
BAC level for the United States.  Figure 24 shows the same information for Oregon 
statewide.  In both the United States and Oregon, approximately 35% of all participants 
fatally injured in a fatal alcohol-involved crash had a BAC level of 0.08 or higher, or above 
the legal limit. Approximately 5% of all participants fatally injured in a fatal alcohol-
involved crash had a BAC of 0.01 – 0.07.  Approximately 60% of all participants fatally 
injured in a fatal alcohol-involved crash had a BAC of 0.00 highlighting the common 
perception that “innocent” people are more likely to be the victims in alcohol-involved 
crashes.   Over the 10 years, the share of persons fatally injured by BAC level category 















































0.00 0.01 - 0.07 0.08+
Source: FARS  
Figure 23: Percent Makeup of Persons in United States Fatally Injured in Fatal Alcohol-Involved 
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Source: FARS
 
Figure 24: Percent Makeup of Persons in Oregon Statewide Fatally Injured in Fatal Alcohol-Involved 
Crashes by Highest BAC Level, 1995-2004 
 
The percentage of participants fatally injured by age group for alcohol-involved crashes (total 
of 508, 216, and 173 for Oregon urban areas, Multnomah County, and City of Portland, 
respectively) is displayed in Figures 25, 26, and 27.  For comparison purposes, the 
percentage of participants fatally injured or injured in all crashes by age group (total of 1335, 
537, and 416 for Oregon urban areas, Multnomah County, and City of Portland, respectively) 
is also displayed in the same figures.  For both alcohol-involved crashes and all crashes, the 
most participants fatally injured in all three jurisdictions occurred between the ages of 21-30 
and 36-45 age groups.    Comparing the data for alcohol-involved crashes and all crashes, the 
percentage of participants fatally injured is much more shifted in these age groups for 
alcohol-involved crashes than all crashes.  For all crashes, the number of participants fatally 




The percentage of participants fatally injured or injured by gender for alcohol-involved 
crashes (total of 508, 216, and 173 for Oregon urban areas, Multnomah County, and City of 
Portland, respectively) is displayed in Figures 28, 29, and 30.  For comparison purposes, the 
percentage of participants fatally injured or injured in all crashes by gender (total of 1335, 
537, and 416 for Oregon urban areas, Multnomah County, and City of Portland, respectively) 
is also displayed.  In Oregon urban areas, Multnomah County, and the City of Portland, 
approximately 70% and 80% of the participants fatally injured in all crashes and in alcohol-
involved crashes, respectively, are males.  For alcohol-involved crashes, male participants 
fatally injured exceed females fatally injured in all jurisdictions by approximately 10%.  
The percentage of persons in the United States, Oregon statewide, and Multnomah County 
involved in a fatal alcohol-involved crash by race or ethnicity is displayed in Figures 31, 32, 
and 33.  Oregon statewide data were used in this analysis instead of Oregon urban areas 
because the FARS dataset, which was used for the analysis, does not have a field coding for 
Oregon urban areas.   
The trends for the percentage of persons in the United States and Oregon statewide involved 
in a fatal alcohol-involved crash by race/ethnicity are similar.  Of all persons involved in a 
fatal alcohol-involved crash from 2001 to 2004, persons of the Non-Hispanic Native 
Americans race / ethnicity are overrepresented in fatal alcohol-involved crashes.  It should be 
noted, however, that the total number of persons in the Native American population is much 
smaller and may therefore skew the percentages.  Asian/Pacific Islander race appears to be 



























































































Alcohol-Involved Crashes All Crashes
Source: ODOT
 
Figure 25: Percentage of Fatally Injured Participants in All Alcohol-Involved and All Crashes by Age – 




























































































Alcohol Involved Crashes All Crashes
Source: ODOT
 
Figure 26: Percentage of Fatally Injured Participants in All Alcohol-Involved and All Crashes by Age – 

























































































Alcohol Involved Crashes All Crashes
Source: ODOT
 
Figure 27: Percentage of Fatally Injured Participants in All Alcohol-Involved and All Crashes by Age – 































Alcohol-Involved Crashes All Crashes
Source: ODOT
 
Figure 28: Percentage of Fatally Injured Participants in All Alcohol-Involved and All Crashes by Gender 

































Alcohol Involved Crashes All Crashes
Source: ODOT
 
Figure 29: Percentage of Fatally Injured Participants in All Alcohol-Involved and All Crashes by Gender 































Alcohol Involved Crashes All Crashes
Source: ODOT
 
Figure 30: Percentage of Fatally Injured Participants in All Alcohol-Involved and All Crashes by Gender 













































2001 2002 2003 2004
Source: FARS / US Census  
Figure 31: Percentage of Persons in United States Population Involved in a Fatal Alcohol-Involved Crash 
















































2001 2002 2003 2004
Source: FARS / US Census
 
Figure 32: Percentage of Persons in Oregon Statewide (Not Urban Areas) Population Involved in A Fatal 

















































2001 2002 2003 2004
Source: FARS / US Census  
Figure 33: Percentage of Persons in Multnomah County Population Involved in A Fatal Alcohol-Involved 
Crash by Race / Ethnicity, 2001 – 2004 
 
2.3.5 Temporal Issues for DUII Crashes 
The percentage of fatal alcohol-involved crashes by month for Oregon urban areas, 
Multnomah County, and City of Portland for 2004 is displayed in Figure 34, 35, and 36.  
There does not appear to be any consistent pattern.  The percentage of fatal alcohol-involved 
crashes by day of week for Oregon urban areas, Multnomah County, and City of Portland for 
2004 is displayed in Figure 37, 38, and 39.  As one might expect, the majority of fatal 
alcohol-involved crashes occur on weekends.  The percentage of fatal alcohol-involved 
crashes by hour of day for Oregon urban areas, Multnomah County, and City of Portland for 
2004 is displayed in Figure 40, 41, and 42.  The majority of fatal alcohol-involved crashes 
occur on nights between 5 PM and 9 PM and again from 12 AM to 2 AM.   A surface plot of 
alcohol-involved crashes by hour of day and weekday for a ten-year history in Multnomah 
County is displayed in Figures 43 and 44.  These figures highlight that the most common 
time for an alcohol-involved crash is during the weekend late night and early morning hours, 
with Friday and Saturday being the most common. Note that Friday’s peak starts later (10 






















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 42: Total Percentage of Fatal Alcohol-Involved Crashes by Hour of Day – Oregon, Multnomah 

















































Data on enforcement activities was taken from three primary sources: 1) the Oregon Uniform 
Crime Reporting Program, 2) ODOT Transportation Safety Division DUII Control System 
Performance Measures, and 3) the Portland Police Bureau. The Oregon Uniform Crime 
Reporting Program (OUCR) publishes an annual report of statewide criminal offenses and 
arrests.  The Law Enforcement Data System (LEDS) is the database in which all police 
agencies in Oregon participate. The ODOT Transportation Safety Division publishes a DUII 
Control System Performance Measures for Oregon Counties every year.  Data in the report 
covers the previous 10 years and includes compiled statistics on DUII crashes, enforcement 
activity, court activity, and youth.  The Portland Police Bureau publishes an annual report 
which includes traffic statistics as reported by the Portland Police Bureau’s Traffic Division.  
The total number of DUII offenses for each Oregon county from 2000-2005 is shown in 
Table 3. The 2005 population for each county is also shown. Two performance metrics were 
computed for enforcement activities: 1) the average annual offenses per 10,000 people and 2) 
the average annual offenses per average annual alcohol-related fatalities (from Table 2). 
These metrics are shown as thematic plots in Figure 45.   Neither metric completely explains 
the variation of enforcement intensity or activity but they do provide useful benchmarks.    
The first metric captures the enforcement intensity per population. Over the five-year period 
approximately 25,000 offenses per year were reported statewide. In Multnomah County, an 
average of 3,450 offenses was reported.  With a population of approximately 675,600 
persons in the county over the five-year period there were 51.07 offences per 10,000 people.  
In comparison, the DUII rate per 10,000 persons statewide for the same year is 70.26 
offenses per 10,000 people. Of the other region’s metro counties Clackamas had a higher 
reported enforcement per population (93.37) but Washington was comparable to Multnomah 
at 53.10.   
The second metric is not tabulated in Table 3 but shown thematically in Figure 45B. Higher 
ratios (lighter shades) would tend to suggest more active enforcement levels. Compared to 
Clackamas and Washington, Multnomah’s activity level is lower but is still among the higher 
ratios statewide. Time series bar charts for total DUII offenses, which comprises primarily 
alcohol use for statewide and Multnomah County is displayed in Figure 46 and 47.  Figure 48 
displays the total number of DUII offenses by BAC statewide, for 2004. Figure 49 displays 
the total number of DUII offenses by BAC for Oregon statewide from 1995-2004. Most 
offenses resulted in DUIIs of over 0.08 and up to 0.19. Figure 50 displays the total number of 
DUII arrests statewide and in the City of Portland.  Citywide total number of arrests equates 
to approximately 2,100 arrests per year.  Figure 51 displays the average and high BAC values 
of persons arrested for DUII in Multnomah County for 2000-2005.  All years show similar 
trends of an average of a BAC of 0.15 and high BAC of approximately 0.50 with the 
exception of 2003.  It is unknown why the average BAC level in 2003 was lower than 0.05.  
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Baker     16,600  143 108 137 144 102 89 121 72.59 21 
Benton     80,400  329 348 382 453 683 564 460 57.19 33 
Clackamas   350,900  2,229 3,324 3,964 3,613 3,408 3,121 3,277 93.37 10 
Clatsop     36,200  452 510 498 430 453 428 462 127.58 2 
Columbia     44,900  331 359 378 244 234 258 301 66.96 27 
Coos     62,800  591 477 637 516 528 479 538 85.67 16 
Crook     20,500  223 210 175 247 200 214 212 103.17 5 
Curry     21,200  255 227 227 153 166 136 194 91.51 12 
Deschutes   128,900  1,068 977 1,116 979 1,037 1,077 1,042 80.86 19 
Douglas   101,700  995 954 906 864 781 700 867 85.22 17 
Gilliam      1,900  39 25 37 29 21 24 29 153.51 1 
Grant      7,800  49 56 56 44 63 61 55 70.30 24 
Harney      7,600  121 58 58 48 61 83 72 94.08 9 
Hood River     20,700  282 320 314 62 158 129 211 101.85 7 
Jackson   188,100  1,622 1,752 1,799 1,631 1,434 1,271 1,585 84.25 18 
Jefferson     19,800  239 231 231 155 143 104 184 92.85 11 
Josephine     77,800  797 774 813 697 604 407 682 87.66 13 
Klamath     64,500  667 614 621 478 492 460 555 86.10 15 
Lake      7,500  66 66 47 58 60 50 58 77.11 20 
Lane   329,300  2,071 2,180 2,149 2,358 2,464 2,209 2,239 67.98 25 
Lincoln     44,600  489 488 433 482 402 454 458 102.69 6 
Linn   104,800  1,019 836 798 613 625 545 739 70.55 23 
Malheur     31,900  269 198 212 262 213 147 217 67.97 26 
Marion   293,500  1,921 1,644 1,657 1,363 1,697 1,935 1,703 58.02 32 
Morrow     11,500  74 111 122 84 8 24 71 61.30 31 
Multnomah   675,600  3,897 3,289 2,466 3,670 4,171 3,209 3,450 51.07 36 
Polk     64,000  431 429 535 349 425 373 424 66.20 29 
Sherman      1,900  27 29 25 23 21 10 23 118.42 3 
Tillamook     24,800  194 150 172 133 152 177 163 65.73 30 
Umatilla     71,400  878 804 875 766 723 622 778 108.96 4 
Union     24,700  178 213 233 206 226 230 214 86.77 14 
Wallowa      7,200  22 32 35 52 58 27 38 52.31 35 
Wasco     23,800  315 309 277 204 156 135 233 97.76 8 
Washington   467,800  2,406 2,387 2,403 2,249 2,621 2,838 2,484 53.10 34 
Wheeler      1,500  8 7 13 18 11 3 10 66.67 28 
Yamhill     87,800  652 601 550 513 797 664 630 71.70 22 
TOTALS 3,525,900 25,349 25,097 25,351 24,190 25,398 23,257 24,774 70.26
 




A: Average DUII Offenses per 10,000 Population (Yearly Average in Bubbles), 2000-2005 
 
 
B: Average DUII Offenses per Average Annual Alcohol-Involved Fatalities, 2000-2005 
 









































Source: Oregon Uniform Crime Reports  
























Source: ODOT DUII Control System Performance Measures
 

















































































Source: Oregon Uniform Crime Reports
 

























Source: Portland Police Bureau - Annual Traffic Activity Summary
 
Figure 50: Total Number DUII Arrests – City of Portland 
 
 





2.4.1 Minor in Possession 
The 2006 Healthy Teens survey of Oregon students was conducted statewide of 8th and 11th 
graders about underage drinking.  The survey is conducted annually by the Oregon 
Department of Human Services.  Students were asked about their drinking behaviors in the 
past 30 days since completion of the survey.  Among all eighth graders, binge drinking, the 
consumption five or more drinks in a row, was 13.3%.  This was an increase in 43% from 
9.3% in 2001.  For eleventh graders, the percentage fell over a five year period from 25.3% 
in 2001 to 24.9% in 2006.  The survey also found that parents have a large influence on 
eighth graders on the consumption of alcohol, with 80% of students whose parents thought it 
was “very wrong” to drink who did not drink in the 30 days prior to the date the survey was 
completed.  In comparison, approximately 30% of students whose parents thought it was “not 
wrong at all” to drink in the 30 days prior to the date the survey was completed. For eleventh 
graders this data were 66.9% and 26.7 % respectively.  The survey also showed teens felt it 
was easy to obtain alcohol (Oregon Department of Human Services, 2006). 
 
A minor in possession of alcohol is a possible indicator for future involvement in alcohol-
related events. Figure 52 displays the total number of minor in possessions issued to youth 
under 21 years of age.  The number of MIPS for 1997 and 1999 are unknown.  It is not 
necessarily clear what the reason for the decline in MIP issued since 2001. Anecdotal 
evidence suggests that the issue is possibly related to the reluctance of officers to issue 
citations since the courts have not been able to deal adequately with citations. MIPs in 
Multnomah County have generally been issued warning letters following a citation.   
 
 




2.5 COURT ACTIVITIES 
Figure 53 shows the total number of DUII convictions in Multnomah County.  Of the 2,200 
arrests made in Multnomah County (estimated based City of Portland arrests in Figure 50), 
approximately 1,500 persons arrested are convicted of DUII between 1995 and 2004.  Note 
that some arrested will be first-time offenders and eligible for diversion. Starting 2000, the 
total number of convictions has fallen by approximately 300 persons.  The majority of 
convictions are first DUII convictions as displayed in Figure 54. The DUII Control System 
Performance Measures, produced by ODOT, lists the total number of DUII related DWS / 
DWR (driving while suspended or revoked) convictions.  Figures 55 shows the time trends of 

























Source: ODOT DUII Control System Performance Measures
 
























First DUII Second DUII Third or subsequent DUII 
Source: ODOT DUII Control System Performance Measures
 





























Source: ODOT DUII Control System Performance Measures
 
Figure 55: Total Number of DWS / DWR Misdemeanor Convictions - Multnomah County 
 
2.6 TREATMENT  
The treatment program is an evaluation and rehabilitation program that persons arrested of 
DUII can take if they either sent to diversion or convicted of a DUII.  Diversion agreements 
in Multnomah County as reported by the Oregon DMV are displayed in Figure 56. The   
successful completion or termination of the Multnomah County Alcohol and Drug Treatment 
Program for FY 2006 was approximately 65% (Ryan, 2006). 
 
Figure 56: Diversion Program Trends -Multnomah County, 1994-2004  
 
2.7 SUMMARY 
Analysis of data on crashes, participants, impaired drivers, offenders, enforcement, treatment, 
and public perception reveals the state of the problem on DUII, or driving under the influence 
of intoxicants.   
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• Alcohol-involved crashes are more severe. While fatal crashes account for less than 3% 
of total reported crashes, nearly 30% of alcohol-involved crashes that are fatal. Not 
surprisingly, speed and alcohol crashes are often related. 
• Younger drivers, particularly male, are a risk group for alcohol-involved crashes. The 21-
30 age cohort is overrepresented in alcohol-involved crashes compared to the general 
population.  Males are almost 2 times more likely than females to be involved in a crash 
and about 3 times more likely than females to be involved in a fatal alcohol-involved 
crash.  
• The majority of people fatally injured an alcohol-involved crash had not been drinking. 
Approximately 60% of all participants fatally injured in an alcohol-involved crash had a 
BAC of 0.00. 
• Most drivers arrested for DUII are well above the 0.08 blood alcohol concentration that is 
the per se legal limit in Oregon. The average BAC of those arrested in Portland is 
approximately 0.15. 
• As one might expect, the majority of fatal alcohol-involved crashes is during the weekend 
late night and early morning hours, with Friday and Saturday being the most common. 
There was also a small peak noted late Wednesday night and early Thursday morning.   
• The average time required for the Portland Police Bureau to process a DUII arrest is 
approximately 2 hours - taking away valuable police presence. Given that 2,194 arrests 
were made in 2005 that is nearly equal to 2 officers working full-time for a year to 
process DUII offenders.  
• Nearly 3,500 DUII arrests (offenses) are made every year in Multnomah County. This is 
approximately 51.07 offenses per 10,000 people (lower that the statewide rate of 70.26). 
However, enforcement activity measures as the rate of fatal alcohol-involved crashes per 
arrests was 150 - the lowest of the three metro counties. 
• Nearly all first time offenders are sent to diversion and court-ordered treatment. The 
completion rate for those that have been sent to treatment program via diversion is 
approximately 65%.  
• Of those arrested and not eligible for diversion, there are approximately 1,600 to 1,300 
convictions per year.  The majority of these convictions have been for a first DUII (not 
counting diversion), however, about one third of all convictions have been for subsequent 




3.0 CURRENT PRACTICES  
This chapter summarizes the current practices as they relate to the prevention, enforcement, 
adjudication and treatment of DUII related-offenses in the Portland and Multnomah County 
region. This summary was compiled through review of existing documentation and interview 
techniques of key persons in each area. Interviews of the City of Portland’s DUII Working 
Group were conducted by researchers from Portland State University between April and May 
2006.  Prior to the 30 minute to 1 hour long interview, members were provided a list of 




Prevention is the approach of changing or modifying behaviors such that the problem that 
needs addressing never occurs in the first place. Education and media campaigns can prevent 
impaired driving by making people aware of impaired driving laws and the consequences of 
driving impaired. Educational information can be provided to the public through a variety of 
avenues and has traditional been done at the state-level by television, print, and radio ads.  In 
Portland, many education programs are offered through treatment programs for first time and 
repeat offenders.  These campaigns are achieved through general impaired driving education 
classes or media campaigns similar in nature to the national seat belt campaign.  They are 
usually directed at the general population, but can also be directed at specific demographic 
such as youths.  
 
3.1.1 Trauma Care 
Approximately 80%-90% of trauma surgeries are traffic related with at least 60% involving 
intoxicants of some form. People brought into trauma care are often under the influence of 
more than one intoxicant.  The “Trauma Nurses Talk Tough” (TNTT) program is one 
example of an educational program sponsored by Legacy Health System of hospitals and 
health care provider services in Oregon.  The TNTT program was established in 1986 by 
three trauma care nurses to prevent and lessen the severity of traffic injuries (Legacy Health 
System, 2007).  Seatbelt and helmet use is covered in this section because of their 
effectiveness in reducing the severity of all traffic collision incidents.  Classes are offered to 
patients and their families and taught by trauma nurses, medics, EMTs, and physicians.  Each 
class is different depending on the age of the participants.  Some classes may offer a Parent 
Educator program.  TNTT programs are offered in 48 elementary, middle, and high schools 
throughout the state.  In these school education programs, TNTT educators educate students 
and/or parents about traffic safety and substance abuse issues. For instance, students are 
educated on the importance of buckling up when in a vehicle and reminding others to buckle 
up as well, wearing a helmet when riding a bicycle, and learning the “rules of the road”.  A 
pre-post survey of self-reported behavior taken in 2004-2005 shows that 48% to 61% of 




Other TNTT classes conducted in the past include a Victim Speakers or Victims Impact 
Panel program in which people who have been injured share their stories of how the injury 
affected them physically, emotionally, and financially (Trauma Nurses Talk Tough, 2006).  
Pre and post surveys on self-reported behavior have indicated the overall program to be 
effective (Trauma Nurses Talk Tough, 2006).  The program was cancelled due to funding 
issues and problems getting people to pay for the class.  A TNTT class that is no longer 
offered due to funding issues that addresses alcohol and drug use and driving is the “Not My 
Kid” (NMK) Campaign.  This two hour forum was offered to youths 10-18 years of age and 
their parents at 23 Oregon Middle and High Schools for youths and their parents.  It was 
supported by law enforcement, health experts, insurance industry, the legal community, 
victims, and family educators who teach parents and their children about the consequences 
and liabilities of impaired driving (Trauma Nurses Talk Tough, 2006).  It is a program also 
supported by diversion courts (Todd, 2006).   A pre-post survey conducted in 2001 showed 
75% - 90% of participants felt they would make some safety change.  Another new class that 
is being offered is the Insight Class, which is focused on students caught at school with 
alcohol (Fairchild, 2006).  While many classes offered in the TNTT program are optionally 
attended, some are court ordered.   
Two TNTT classes are court ordered and target alcohol use.  One class is the MIP Over 18 & 
Adult Furnishing Class.  This three hour class is directly related to alcohol and is taken by 
anyone furnishing alcohol or providing a place for consumption of alcohol by minors.  The 
class is offered in two locations.  A self-reported survey conducted in 2005 indicated that 
43% to 90% would make some change to stop underage drinking (Trauma Nurses Talk 
Tough, 2006).   The second court ordered class is the Minors in Possession Class.  This 3 
hour class, which is available in four Oregon hospital locations, is taken by youths cited for a 
being a minors in possession of alcohol (MIP) and their parents.   An evaluation of the class 
was conducted in 2005 at Emanuel Hospital.  Self-reported test showed that approximately 
55% of youth participants said they would either stop using alcohol until they were 21 years 
old or would increase participating in alcohol-free activities. Approximately 95% of parents 
said they would monitor alcohol in the home and something should be done about driving 
privileges for youths citied for an MIP.  Trauma nurses do not feel enforcing MIP laws is a 
priority.  However, research by Dent, Grube, and Biglan (2004) of alcohol use in Oregon 
high schools indicates that for minors, strong enforcement of MIP resulted in lower levels of 
alcohol use and binge drinking, but not in school or driving. By actively involving the 
participants in a problem-posing style of learning, participants who attend the TNTT classes 
are made aware of the effects of high risk behavior and are empowered to do something 
about their behaviors all with the support of their families.  
3.1.1.1 Possible Improvement Areas 
A possible issue of concern is funding for the TNTT programs.  Some programs are able to 
cover costs through participant fees while others rely on state grants.  Already many viable 
programs have been cancelled due to budget cuts. 
 
3.1.2 Oregon Liquor Control Commission 
The Oregon Liquor Control Commission (OLCC) was established in 1933 following the 
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repeal of prohibition.  The OLCC serves as the state’s regulatory agency for those who 
manufacture, sell, or serve alcohol (Oregon Liquor Control Commission, 2004). The OLCC 
does not have policy making responsibilities, rather, policies for the OLCC are set by a five-
member governor appointed and Senate confirmed board of commissioners.  Each 
commissioner serves four-year terms and represents a congressional district in Oregon 
(OLCC, 2004).  
One responsibility of the OLCC is regulating the manufacture, distribution and service of 
alcohol through mandatory licensing for individuals or businesses that sell or serve alcohol. 
Licensing requires a successful criminal background check.  In Oregon, approximately 
11,000 licenses were issued in 2004 (OLCC, 2006).  The OLCC also regulates the 
distribution of liquor. Approximately 250 retail liquor stores throughout the state purchase 
liquor for distribution from OLCC’s liquor distribution center (OLCC, 2004). Most of these 
stores sell exclusively liquor. The program is a major source of revenue for state and local 
programs. The majority of OLCC revenue is distributed to the state’s general fund.  
A second responsibility of the OLCC is server permitting. The OLCC requires all alcoholic 
beverage servers who mix, serve, or sell alcohol and managers who supervise servers to take 
and pass a state approved server training course promoting responsible drinking.  “In Oregon, 
it is against the law to serve alcohol to a visibly intoxicated person or allow a visibly 
intoxicated customer to continue drinking alcohol” (OLCC, 2007). The course must be taken 
every five years.  The course, which is offered in Chinese and Spanish, covers the effects of 
alcohol on the body, interaction effects of alcohol with other drugs, both prescription and 
illicit, problem drinking and alcoholism, State of Oregon alcohol service laws, drinking and 
driving laws in Oregon as well as legal liability issues, effective server intervention 
techniques including how to intervene with a customer who is drinking too much or shows 
signs of intoxication, and alcohol marketing practices for responsible alcohol service.  
A third responsibility of the OLCC is enforcing license and permit requirements by making 
targeted and random visits to establishments, often accompanied by local police officers, and 
issuing citations to license and permit holders where necessary.  In 2003, approximately 
13,000 observation visits were conducted on licensed premises (OLCC, 2006).  In about half 
of those visits, server permits were checked.  OLCC enforcement officers issued 720 
criminal citations for clerks. Approximately 695 administrative notices of violations were 
also issued.  A total of about 20,000 criminal citations and administrative notice of violations 
for servers have been issued since the program’s inception in 1979. 
Another OLCC offered education program is the Responsible Vendor Program (OAR 845-
009-0135). In this program, started in 1999, the OLCC provides education through 
partnerships with businesses and other organization such as MADD or the Oregon 
Department of Human Services.   OLCC has also worked with business organizations, such 
as ONSA, the Oregon Neighborhood Store Association, (www.onsa.net) who work 
especially on behalf of small storeowners to promote the Responsible Vendor Program.  
Under the program, which owners have to qualify for based on responsible service behavior, 
if they go through the program and are in compliance, they will qualify for reduced fines 
and/or suspensions if they sell to a minor.  The program provides additional training and 
requires the establishment and posting of house policies regarding service of alcohol to 
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patrons. The program, however, is not utilized by all owners. ONSA reports 95% of its 
members are not taking advantage of the program (Oregon Neighborhood Store Association 
and OLCC, 2007).   
The OLCC also has a Clerk Training Program, which started in 1999, to target clerks selling 
alcohol to minors.  This program is only taken if a clerk has been found to sell to a minor. 
OLCC performance may be improved by placing a bigger emphasis on underage drinking. 
The OLCC currently has an underage drinking program called the Minor Decoy Operations 
which was initiated in 1997 (Miliucci, 2006).  In this program, OLCC enforcement officers 
can target specific drinking establishments or retail stores upon receiving a complaint or 
conduct random observation visits of establishments.  Another concern raised is the number 
of enforcement officers.  Currently, the state has 45 enforcement officers for 11,500 licensed 
establishments. The system could benefit from obtaining additional funding for hiring more 
enforcement officers.  
3.1.3 Restaurant and Bar Associations 
The Oregon Restaurant Association (ORA) represents over 9,000 restaurants and beverage 
businesses statewide.  A part of the ORA, the Oregon Restaurant Education Foundation 
(OREF) was founded in 1991 and works with the OLCC as a provider of Alcohol Server 
Education classes so servers can receive permits to serve alcohol.  Currently, first time 
servers are required to take the 4.5 hour course in person and servers renewing their permits 
may take renewal courses offered online.  The ORA is currently working with OLCC to 
make the mandatory class online (Oregon Restaurant Association, 2007).  The cost to take 
the Alcohol Server Education course is $30.  Successful completion of the course is 
measured by a written 50-question multiple choice test in which the server must pass with 
80% (ORA, 2006), which is 10% higher than the passing score required by the OLCC.  In 
2004, 5,475 Oregonians were trained (Oregon Restaurant Association, 2007-2).   
 
3.2 ENFORCEMENT  
3.2.1 Portland Police Bureau 
In the City of Portland, the Portland Police Bureau is organized into several precincts and 
divisions.  Each precinct and division has their own specific enforcement duties.  While all 
precincts and divisions have officers who enforce DUII, the Traffic Division handles most of 
the traffic enforcement, including DUIIs, citywide (Krueger, 2006).  In 2004, 2,084 DUII 
arrests were made citywide. The number of arrests increased slightly by 5% to 2,194 in 2005 
(Portland Police Bureau, 2005).  The Portland Police Bureau may enforce DUII either 
reactively by responding to a collision event, notification of or neighborhood complaint call 
through the Enhanced Vehicle Safety Enforcement Program (EVSEP), or proactively by 
conducting planned enforcement missions in entertainment areas, during holidays, or random 
or planned lane restriction missions to look for violators.  It should be noted that sobriety 
checkpoints and roadblocks are illegal in Oregon as a result of an Oregon Supreme Court 
ruling on search and seizure, ruling sobriety checkpoints as unconstitutional.  However, 
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increased DUII enforcement does occur during the holidays.  These are usually announced 
prior to the day of increased enforcement.   
Officers may also stop drivers at any time for suspicion of DUII based on reasonable 
grounds.   In Oregon, implied consent laws apply (ORS 813.100).  As a provision to being 
issued a driver’s license, when a driver is stopped for suspicion of DUII and asked to take a 
chemical breath / blood / urine or field sobriety test, the driver must consent to take the test.  
In Oregon, law enforcement officers will, after informing the driver of the consequences and 
their rights under ORS 813.130, first ask drivers to take a chemical breath test or blood test if 
receiving medical care.  If the driver consents and their blood alcohol level is 0.08 or more, 
the driver will be arrested for a DUII and their license will be confiscated.  A driver may also 
be arrested if there is probable cause of being under the influence of an intoxicating liquor or 
controlled substance.  
Once a driver is arrested and their license is confiscated, the police officer will provide the 
person with a written notice of intent to suspend the license (ORS 813.100).  They will then 
transport the individual to jail. Central City Concern (CCC) established a David P. Hooper 
Detoxification Center in 1971.  A van picks up and transports impaired persons to the 
detoxification center where they can safely sober up.  Law enforcement officers may also 
take individuals to the detoxification center.  The center also provides services where 
individuals can stay for up to a week and receive counseling, treatment, and education.  The 
center is dependent upon the state, county, and city for funding and is currently receiving 
funds to allow it to operate 24 hours a day.  Although most individuals who go to this center 
are pedestrians, it does have the benefit of freeing up jail space for impaired drivers (City of 
Portland, 2004). 
 
3.2.1.1 Possible Improvement Areas 
As suggested during the interviews, on possible area that could be improved include 
requiring drivers to submit to a mandatory blood draw upon arrest, and increasing the penalty 
for refusal of a breath test.   Administratively, an improvement measure could be to increase 
the priority of enforcing DUII across all precincts.  The Traffic Division has from 33% to 
50% of the number of officers compared to other precincts.  The limited staff sometimes 
makes it difficult for the Traffic Division to provide adequate coverage citywide. It could 
help DUII enforcement efforts to increase priority of DUII enforcement in other precincts, 
especially during nights and weekends. This could be resolved either by an emphasizing the 
priority of DUII enforcement from leadership in each precinct and/or by increasing the 
familiarity of all officers with current DUII enforcement procedures (Krueger, 2006). 
Finally, traffic officers are often required to go to traffic court at inconvenient times.  
Although no solution has currently been proposed, it could save time and money for courts to 
coordinate their efforts with local police to reduce the time police officers spend at court. The 
total time required to process a DUII can be challenging. 
 
3.3 ADJUDICATION 
The Multnomah County Courthouse is the largest circuit court in Oregon. Approximately 
3,000 DUII cases are screened each year.  In Oregon, the DUII relevant laws are codified 
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under Oregon Revised Statutes Chapter 813. After a DUII arrest by law enforcement officers, 
all individuals must attend a court hearing.    Prosecutors may decide whether or not to try a 
case depending on available evidence (e.g. BAC level of at least 0.08).  If there is sufficient 
evidence there will be an arraignment.    
 
3.3.1 Possible Court Sanctions 
3.3.1.1 General 
A first time offender is often sent to diversion. If convicted of a DUII, a fine will be issued of 
up to $10,000 (Note that $6,250 is the maximum unless a minor is in the vehicle and is 3 
years younger than the convicted driver).  The fine amounts are set based on the defendant’s 
past DUII record and depend on the severity of case particulars.  The minimum fines are:  
 
• 1st offense = $1000 minimum 
• 2nd offense = $1500 minimum 
• 3rd + offense = $2000 minimum if not sentenced to a term of imprisonment 
 
Individuals charged with a DUII offense may obtain the services of an attorney to represent 
them in a hearing, who lead them through the entire prosecution process.  No interviews were 
conducted of lawyers outside of the District Attorney’s office.  It is therefore unknown what 
opportunities if any exist for prevention of second DUII offenses from lawyers representing 
defendants in DUII cases.   
 
In addition to fines, the following sanctions may be imposed:  
 
• Complete a screening interview to determine placement  for treatment and 
attend mandatory treatment program 
• Imprisonment for 48 hours, served consecutively or community service not less 
than 80 hrs or more than 250 hrs. It is common for the prosecution to ask for 10 
day minimums.  
• Complete Victim Impact Panel treatment program (at own cost unless indigent) 
 
Additional fees for screening interview and treatment programs are to be paid for by the 
defendant.  Other sanctioning programs include home arrest with electronic monitoring, 
treatment as part of a diversion program, intensive supervision probationary treatment 
programs for repeat offenders, vehicle forfeiture, impoundment, immobilization, registration 
suspension, ignition interlock, suspension or revocation of drivers’ license, and imprisonment 
(The Century Council, 2007-2).  The average DUII costs $6,418 and can range from $1,570 
to $11,266 (Multnomah County DUII Evaluation Program, 2006).   
 
3.3.1.2 License Suspension  
If a driver refuses to take the breath test, their license will be suspended and a temporary 
driving permit of 30 days may be issued at the discretion of the Oregon Department of 
Transportation.  The refusal is considered a traffic offense and in addition to any DUII 
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related fines, the driver could pay a fine of at least $500 to $1000 (ORS 813.095). The 
minimum ODL suspension period is:  
• Refusal to take a breath, urine, or blood test:  
o 1st offense = 1 yr / no hardship 90 days 
o 2nd offense = 3 yrs / no hardship 1 yr 
• If BAC ≥ 0.08:  
o 1st offense = 90 days / no hardship 30 days 
o 2nd offense = 1 yr / no hardship 90 days 
 
3.3.1.3 House Arrest 
Some repeat DUII offenders can participate in an electronically monitored house arrest 
program as an alternative to incarceration.   In such monitoring programs, a device is 
attached to the wrist or ankle of the offender.  The device can transmit signals to a computer 
indicating the offender’s presence in an assigned area.  Some devices have been equipped 
with an alcohol breath device where the offender is required to take a test after receiving a 
random call.  
 
3.3.1.4 Ignition Interlock 
Persons convicted of DUII and granted hardship permits may be required to have any vehicle 
the offender drives installed with an ignition interlock device (ORS 813.602).  Any 
tampering of an ignition interlock device will result in further suspension of license.   Other 
persons who knowingly furnish motor vehicle without an ignition interlock device or blows 
into the device for the offender will be subject to a Class A traffic violation (ORS 813.608).   
 
3.3.2 DUII Intensive Supervision Program (DISP) 
Multnomah County has a DUII Intensive Supervision Program (DISP) program to treat 
repeat DUII offenders on an individually supervised basis.  The program was started in 1992 
by Judge Dorothy Baker and is now supervised by Judge Eric J. Bloch.   DISP participants 
are on probation for three years under the program.  In this time, they are subject to random 
alcohol testing, attending educational meetings, and it is entirely offender funded. The DISP 
program is most effective when payments are not a hassle, expectations are made clear, 
failure for completing treatment is addressed quickly and stopping BAC refusals (Dieter, 
2006).  Improvements can be made in these areas through changes in the Oregon 
Administrative Rule pertaining to treatment program responsibilities, legislation for DUII 
penalties, and adding DUII Evaluators as part of the Court system process (Dieter, 2006). 
The biggest barrier in the DISP program has been getting low income clients to pay for 
treatment.  Fees are often waived for 38% of all clients.  
 
3.4 TREATMENT 
3.4.1 Court Ordered Diversion 
In the Oregon, if a person is arrested and charged for DUII they are typically referred to 
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diversion if it is their first DUII offense.  They will not get a conviction if they agree to 
participate and successfully complete a treatment program. Before attending a treatment 
program, individuals first participate in a screening program. This is provided by a treatment 
provider and the screening interview meets all standards set by the Director of Human 
Services.  It is preferred that the provider conducting the screening interview not be the 
treatment provider.  Individuals entering diversion are required to go through a DUII 
Rehabilitation Program, or treatment program. 
 
There are a variety of treatment program sponsors in the City of Portland and Multnomah 
County.  These treatment providers monitor the progress of the individual and report to the 
referring court that individual’s treatment status.  In Multnomah County, County-sponsored 
DUII Evaluators and Alcohol and Drug Evaluation Specialists (ADES) personnel work as the 
liaison between treatment providers and the courts. Guidelines and criteria used to determine 
the appropriate treatment program and measure the effectiveness of the treatment of 
convicted DUII clients by the treatment. The client is placed into an appropriate treatment 
program based on his/her needs and severity of illness (American Society of Addiction 
Medicine, 2006). 
 
Clients of treatment programs are informed and educated about alcohol and other substance 
abuse (DUII Working Group, Jan 30 2006).  Completion of the DUII Rehabilitation Program 
in Multnomah County for fiscal year 2006 was 71.8% for diversion courts, 57.9% for those 
convicted, and 67% for a the combined.  The combined completion rate of 67% was 
consistent with the national average. As part of the treatment program, many DUII clients 
may be required to attend a Victim Impact Panel. Panel members consist of volunteers who 
have been injured or experienced a personal DUII related loss (Maginn, 2005).  A source of 
funding for the Victim Impact Panel is provided through the Intoxicated Driver Program 
Fund (ORS 813.270).  
 
3.4.1.1 Possible Improvement Areas 
One concern with the effectiveness of treatment programs is the lack of resources to handle 
all individuals who are required to undergo treatment.  In fiscal year 2006 for Multnomah 
County, the waiting list for inpatient treatment was 4-6 months (DUII Working Group, Jan 
30 2006). Treatment non-compliance related to the failure to pay for treatment continues to 
be a problem.  DUII Program Evaluators in Multnomah County want to avoid a client’s 
failure to complete the treatment program for payment purposes and other court related 
complications.  A report of clients in this situation needs to be reported back to ADES in a 
timely manner for proper handling (Ryan, Jan 2006).  One suggestion made to improve the 
non-compliance is to have the program sited in the Courthouse (Dieter, 2006). Other changes 
to handle non-compliance include making phone calls on the next day, writing letters, and 
sending notices to DUII clients (Ryan, Dec 2005). 
 
A related concern involves the continued ability to provide treatment for qualified indigent 
clients meeting a certain income level and have an Oregon Health Plan.  ADES is concerned 
the number of slots will be reduced in the coming years due to funding cutbacks (Ryan, Jan 
2006). A final concern is the number of repeat clients of treatment programs. Recent activity 
to improve the medical treatment process include sending clients with a BAC of 0.20 and 
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above through the adjudication process and medical treatment program assignment on the 
same day, seeing clients who come to the office on that day and explaining to them how they 
can fulfill court requirements, and establishing individual payment plans (Ryan, Dec 2005).  
Such recent efforts have decreased the number of clients send back to the court by 50%.  
 
3.5 SUMMARY 
In summary, it is helpful to think of the process that leads to an individual impaired driver 
operating a vehicle in three general temporal steps – pre-drinking, during drinking, and post 
drinking activities. Those involved in attempting to mitigate the adverse social effects of 
impaired driving generally target their activities in one or more of these temporal steps. A 
simple flowchart representing these steps and activities are shown in Figure 58. This 
representation is essentially the classical Haddon matrix.  Policy and procedures are 
generally set by the state legislature with input from the Governor’s Advisory Council on 
DUII and is shown at the top of the figure. On the far left of the figure each primary actor in 
the process is given a color code. For example, the OLCC is represented by yellow coloring. 
The individual is represented by light blue. When multiple actors are shown for topic, the 
primary is shown on top with the other influencing actors placed behind. For example, the 
service of alcohol is primarily regulated by the OLCC but can be influenced by restaurant 
and beverage industry as well as enforcement. 
 
On the far right, the three temporal frames are shown. The activities of each primary actor are 
placed in the chart at the appropriate temporal frame. For example, the Oregon Liquor 
Control Commission (OLCC) regulates those who manufacture, sell, or serve alcohol.  Their 
activities are represented in the yellow shapes - primarily in the “pre-drinking” time.  The 
restaurants and beverage industry (shown by grey boxes) operates in these same areas. The 
efforts of these actors are to ensure that alcohol is consumed legally in a controlled manner.  
The primary actor, clearly, is the individual. Once the individual elects to consume alcohol 
the outcomes are determined by their choices and action. The decision to consume alcohol 
(and how much) can be affected by education, servers, or enforcement.  If individual engages 
in behavior that results in impairment and chooses to operate a vehicle one of three possible 
outcomes will occur. They will be involved in a crash, found and stopped by law 
enforcement, or perhaps more likely (unfortunately) complete their action with no apparent 
consequence. If they enter the enforcement / judicial system they will be engaged by 
treatment, education actors or have sanctions imposed on them. Clearly, there is potential for 
overlap of these important players in the system. The figure also (simplistically) represents 

























































4.0 REVIEW OF BEST PRACTICES 
Impaired driving and driving under the influence of intoxicants has been the focus of a 
substantial amount of research. In the following subsections, research highlighting best 
practices are critically summarized and reviewed. The field is dynamic and covers a wide 
spectrum of knowledge; this review should not be considered comprehensive. The best 
practices are summarized by focus area. 
4.1 PREVENTION 
4.1.1 Public Information and Education Campaigns 
Targeting behavioral and social practices are essential in preventing impaired driving.  Public 
information and education campaigns are seen as a prevention tool aimed at the general 
public or at specific target groups such as youths or college students.  In other words, they 
are general deterrence programs ranging from general campaigns on drinking and driving, 
usually done at the national level, to offering education classes or supplementing 
enforcement with media coverage.  Despite the many different types of public information 
and education campaigns, few have been evaluated (Hedlund and McCartt, 2002).  
At the federal and regional level, MADD has been visible in increasing public awareness of 
impaired driving.  MADD is working with each state’s Governor’s Highway Safety 
Association, with support from the National Highway Traffic Safety Association, US 
Department of Transportation, and Insurance Institute for Highway Safety, to bring forth a 
“Campaign to Eliminate Drunk Driving” (Governor’s Highway Safety Association, 2007). Of 
focus for the campaign are four key areas: 
 
1. Intensive high-visibility enforcement; 
2. Implementation of ignition interlock programs; 
3. Exploration of advanced vehicle technologies; and 
4. Mobilization of grass roots efforts to fight to eliminate drunk driving. 
 
Another type of education campaign is designating a particular month to focus on impaired 
driving. For example, the month of December is the National Drunk and Drugged Driving 
(“3D”) Prevention Month. This is a prevention campaign aimed at preventing impaired 
driving among youth. Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration 
(SAMHSA). 
 
Televised public service announcements have been a primary medium used to prevent 
alcohol-impaired driving.  Some researchers of these public service announcements (PSA) 
believe there is little evidence to support the notion that these campaigns actually change 
drinking and driving behavior.  For example, Dejong and Atkin (1995) prepared a content 
analysis of PSAs that aired on national television between 1987 and 1992 and found that 
most PSAs were intended to reach a general audience and not necessarily focused on those 
who were at greatest risk for driving while intoxicated.  They also found that almost two-
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thirds of all the PSAs studied included a celebrity, and were designed to create awareness of 
the problem of DUII or to promote individual behavior change, and the use of designated 
drivers.  Dejong and Atkin claim that these media campaigns ignore the fact that people’s 
behavior is shaped by their social environment, which is shaped by public policies.  
Ultimately, they recommend a different approach to more successfully deter DUI, which 
includes future mass media campaigns that focus on changing policies and laws that will 
motivate individuals to change their behavior and sustain initiatives that support those 
persons.   
 
Similarly, Rothschild, Mastin, and Miller (2006) believe that public education campaigns, 
like public service announcements, fail to help decrease the number of alcohol-related 
driving fatalities because they do not address certain social behavior components, such as self 
interest.   Instead, they recommend taking a “social marketing” approach to DUII education 
where target groups can receive immediate benefits for alternative behavior to impaired 
driving.  Researchers initiated a ride program called the Road Crew, where an appealing 
transportation option of riding in an older luxury vehicle would be given to, between, and 
home from bars.  The study was conducted in three rural communities.  Results showed a 
significant shift in driving behavior, particularly among 21-34 year olds.  Because the study 
is so recent, the researchers involved have projected a 17% decrease in alcohol-involved 
crashes in the first year, no increase in drinking behavior, and large savings between the 
reactive cost of crash clean-up efforts and the proactive cost of avoiding these crashes.  To 
date, the program has become self-sustaining based on fares and tavern contributions, and 
have even become part of the community culture.  The Road Crew program was initiated in 
Wisconsin and funded by the NHTSA and the Wisconsin Department of Transportation.  
 
The effectiveness of an education campaign via offering alternative transportation may 
indicate an opportunity to integrate mass education campaigns within the day to day 
activities of those who drink or are involved in preventing impaired driving.  This would 
include coupling sobriety checkpoints with media campaigns.  The goal is a culture change 
among the drinking population.  From the research that has been done, the less effective 
approaches appear to be isolated education campaigns that attempt to make the general 
public aware of impaired driving.  While organizations such as MADD may have started 
with general mass media campaigns, they are now focusing additional efforts on programs 
that focus on the repeat offender, such as through campaigns promoting the use of ignition 
interlocks.  This brings up the effectiveness of mass media campaigns, particularly on the 
youth population who include persons who have never drank before.  Few evaluations on the 
effectiveness of mass media campaigns exist, but those that do exist reveal that they 
generally are not that effective (DeJong and Hingson, 1998).  General education campaigns 
may still be a viable option for the youth population, but may have to be done in a creative 
manner.  Nevertheless, more research needs to be conducted on the effective of mass general 
public information and education campaigns.  
 
One community in Massachusetts is taking a more comprehensive approach to public 
education on alcohol-impaired driving.  Hingson et al. (1996) conducted a study to assess 
whether a community driven program called Saving Lives in Massachusetts, begun in 1988 
where multiple city departments and private citizens were organized, could reduce alcohol-
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impaired driving, related risks, traffic deaths, and injuries.  In each of the communities with a 
Saving Lives program, a full-time coordinator form the mayor’s office organized a task force 
of private citizens and organizations (schools, police, and health) to develop community 
initiatives to deal with DUII education.  Initiatives included media campaigns, business 
information, programs, speeding and drunk driving awareness days, speed watch telephone 
hotlines, police training, high school peer led education, Students Against Drunk Driving 
chapters, college prevention programs, alcohol-free prom nights, beer keg registration, and 
increased liquor outlet surveillance (Hingson et al., 1996). 
 
The method of study consisted of comparing trends in fatal crashes and injuries per 100 
crashes in Saving Lives cities with the rest of Massachusetts from March of 1984 through 
February of 1993.  The group found that in cities with the Saving Lives program, fatal crashes 
decreased 25%, and fatal crashes involving alcohol decreased 42%, with visible injuries 
decreasing 5%.  Additionally, the proportions of vehicles that were observed speeding and 
teenagers who drove after drinking was reduced by 50% over the 5 year period.   This 
suggests that community-based educational efforts targeted in certain areas within a given 
community may be successful at reducing DUI related risks.    
 
News media can be used to educate the public. However, they are also involved where bills 
are taken under consideration.  A study was conducted on the effectiveness of news media in 
Louisiana from 1994 to 2003 on 13 underage alcohol bills relating to bans on minors in bars, 
alcohol tax increase, beer keg registrations, and zero tolerance laws.  The research found high 
press coverage was associated with the unsuccessful passing of alcohol bills with exception 
of the zero tolerance law (Harwood et al., 2005).  The researchers suggest advocacy should 
be concentrating their efforts on laying the groundwork, but not on pushing for the passing of 
the bill directly.  Advocate groups should first consider taking a more “behind the scenes” 
approach by physically present at the legislature, assist legislators in drafting bills and 
personally address policy makers during negotiations itself (Harwood et al., 2005).  If the 
behind the scenes approaches do not work, then they may have to apply more direct 
approaches through the media, particularly with regards to strong opponents.  
 
4.1.1.1 Limitations 
A recent NCHRP Research Results Synthesis 322 suggests that the characteristics of 
unsuccessful programs include the following (quoted directly) : 
 
Unsuccessful programs Successful programs: 
 
• Passive messaging that is communicated by 
signs, pamphlets, brochures, and buttons. 
• Slogans that give simple exhortations for 
people to behave in certain ways to avoid 
undesirable outcomes. 
• Education programs that are lecture-oriented, 
information-only in nature. 
• Short-term programs that have low-intensity 
messages. 
• Use of extreme fear or scare techniques, 
• Public information programs that involve 
careful pre-testing of messages, delineation 
of the target group, and making sure the 
messages reach the target group. 
• Longer-term programs that deliver the 
messages in sufficient intensity over time. 
• Public information programs that 
communicate health knowledge not 
previously well known. 
• Public information implemented in 
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especially when directed at adolescents.  
• Fear messages are given without 
communication of concrete steps that can be 
taken to avoid the danger. 
 
conjunction with other ongoing prevention 
activities—for example, in combination with 
law enforcement programs—publicizing the 
enforcement presence and results of the 
enforcement. 
• Public information and education included as 
part of broader-based, longer-term 
community programs. 
• Education programs based on behavior 
change models, using interactive methods to 
teach skills to resist social influences through 
role playing, behavior rehearsal, and group 
discussion. 
• Fear messages combined with concrete steps 
people can take to avoid the danger 
 
 
4.1.2 Alternative Transportation Programs 
Designated Driver Programs (DDPs) and Ride Service Programs (RSPs) are two types of 
alternative transportation options to help impaired persons safely get to a destination.  DDPs 
can be server-based or community-wide programs.  In a server-based DDP, drinking 
establishment servers can ask an impaired person or friends of the impaired person who the 
designated driver is.  Community-wide DDPs are community based organizations that will 
promote a designated driver (NHTSA).  RSPs are often community based organizations. 
Some operate only during holidays while others are year round.  NHTSA has not found any 
evidence that these programs promote or encourage more drinking or that they are effective 
in reducing fatalities and injury from alcohol-involved crashes.  
Similarly, Rothschild, Mastin, and Miller (2006) believe that public education campaigns, 
like public service announcements, fail to help decrease the number of alcohol-related 
driving fatalities because they do not address certain social behavior components, such as self 
interest.  Instead, they recommend taking a “social marketing” approach to DUII education 
where target groups can receive immediate benefits for alternative behavior to impaired 
driving.  Researchers initiated a ride program called the Road Crew, where an appealing 
transportation option of riding in an older luxury vehicle would be given to, between, and 
home from bars.  The study was conducted in three rural communities.  Results showed a 
significant shift in driving behavior, particularly among 21-34 year olds.  Because the study 
is so recent, the researchers involved have projected a 17% decrease in alcohol-involved 
crashes in the first year, no increase in drinking behavior, and large savings between the 
reactive cost of crash clean-up efforts and the proactive cost of avoiding these crashes.  To 
date, the program has become self-sustaining based on fares and tavern contributions, and 
have even become part of the community culture.  The Road Crew program was initiated in 
Wisconsin and funded by the NHTSA and the Wisconsin Department of Transportation. 
If alternative transportation cannot be provided, another possible solution is to place bars 
near transit lines to encourage transit use.  Transit services would possibly have to run later 
than normally scheduled, especially during weekends. No evaluations have been conducted 
to show the effectiveness of situating bars near transit lines or running late night transit 
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services on reducing impaired driving. A sample table tent is shown in Figure 57. 
  
 
Figure 57: Sample Public Information Materials (ODOT) 
 
   
4.1.3 State Control and Distribution of Alcohol 
Following the repeal of the prohibition in 1933, many states decided to shift the control of 
alcoholic beverage sales to the state (Saltz, 1993).  At first, states had monopoly over alcohol 
sales.  Today, although the distribution of alcohol is primarily privatized, some state agencies 
still have a fair measure of control over the availability of alcohol by assuming the role of 
wholesaler and/or retailer.  As of 2002, 18 states and 1 county controlled the availability of 
alcohol.  These states are known as control states.  States that do not control the availability 
of alcohol, and therefore leave the wholesale and retail aspects of alcohol to the private 
sellers, are known as open or license states (NHTSA, 2002).  
Where the retail purchase of alcohol is controlled, research results indicting effectiveness in 
reducing impaired driving are divided.  However, most indicate a negative relationship 
between retail outlets and alcohol-involved crashes.  Mann et al. (2005) found that the 
majority of studies he reviewed found that a greater presence of outlets, (e.g. mini-markets, 
restaurants, or liquor stores) resulted in a higher number of alcohol-involved crashes.  When 
accounting for the number of beverage outlets per a specific comparable geographic unit of 
area, areas that had more beverage outlets also had more crashes.  Scribner et al. (1994), in a 
study of 72 cities in Los Angeles, found that in a typical city of 500,000 persons and 100 
alcohol outlets, an additional outlet would add an additional 2.7 crashes.  These same areas 
also tended to have more cases of crime and violence (Kwabena, 2001).  Where the price of 
alcohol is set by the state, either by the bottle or through excise taxes, research shows a 
positive impact on alcohol sales and consumption.  When the price of alcohol is high, fewer 
patrons consume alcohol, leading to improved health.  Furthermore, when patrons consume 
less alcohol, enforcement burden is lessened (Mann et al., 2005).  This trend is observed 
nationally and internationally.  
Server programs have also been evaluated by Holder and Wagenaar (1994).  A total of 
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36,000 servers and 6,000 owners were trained when the requirement went into effect.  In 
general, approximately 13,000 new servers are trained a year (Holder and Wagenaar, 1994).  
In 2004, approximately 103,000 active service permits were issued (OLCC, 2004).  Holder 
and Wagenaar evaluated the effectiveness of the Oregon mandated server training program 
on traffic crashes.  Traffic crashes involving a single-vehicle between 8 PM to 4 AM where 
the driver had a nonzero blood alcohol level were evaluated in a before / after study.  Traffic 
crash data from January 1, 1976 to December 31, 1989 was evaluated.  The Oregon server 
training program had a statistically significant effect on single-vehicle nighttime traffic 
crashes.  In the first six months of the new policy, the number of crashes reduced by 4%.  
This reduction rose to 11% by the end of the first year, 18% by the end of the second year, 
and 33% by the end of the third year.  Oregon was the first state in the United States to pass 
legislation to make alcohol server education mandatory (OLCC, 2007). 
Although they do not set alcohol laws, alcohol-control agencies are able to influence laws on 
how, when, and where alcohol is sold and consumed, and how much alcohol can be sold for. 
For example, although they target the entire drinking population, they oftentimes focus on 
minors and visibly intoxicated persons.  Alcohol-control agencies may be able to influence 
laws and regulations that limit the number of retail licenses for drinking establishments and 
therefore control the availability of alcohol.  For example, they may influence the issuance of 
permits for sellers and servers of alcohol at licensed establishments.     
Control over the availability of alcohol has become more flexible, especially as more states 
privatize the sale of alcohol.  In a study evaluating the privatization of wine in five states, 
Alabama, Idaho, Maine, Montana, and New Hampshire, Wagenaar and Holder (1995) found 
increases in wine sales of 42%, 150%, 137%, 75%, and 15%, respectively.  However, 
increased wine sales may not necessarily result in increased levels of crash frequencies or 
severities (Grunewald and Ponicki, 1995).  It should be noted that analysis of alcohol use 
should be broken down into the varying alcohol types (e.g. beer versus distilled spirits, 
versus wine).  Gruenewald and Ponicki (1995) have found that in many cases the occurrence 
of impaired driving occurs primarily with beer as the beverage of choice.  The same is true of 
the type of establishment where the sale occurs (e.g. restaurant or liquor store).  For example, 
Gruenewald and Ponicki (1995) found the single-vehicle nighttime crash fatality rates were 
higher for beer drinkers than spirit or wine sales.  Decreasing beer sales by 1% led to a 1.45% 
decrease in nighttime fatality rates.  One possible strategy to reduce the sale of beer as well 
as spirits and wine leading to impaired driving would be to reduce the sale of alcohol where 
gasoline is also sold.  
4.1.3.1 Limitations 
While the operation of alcohol-control agencies in each state differs, one criticism raised in 
research studies has been that alcohol-control agencies may not place enough emphasis on 
alcohol use prevention.  Their role as controlling the distribution and sale of alcohol to 
generate revenue may conflict with prevention purposes (Saltz, 1993).  Even though 
enforcement of liquor laws may be preventative, many states have inadequate resources to 
have a properly effective enforcement role.  Another problem encountered is that 
requirements for controlling distribution and sale of alcohol differs by state, making it 
difficult for researchers to adequately compare server practices and the effectiveness control 
55 
 
on alcohol availability.  
4.1.4 Third Party Liability 
Third party liability laws on excessive drinking have been around since the early 1900s. At 
first, they were directed at patrons displaying “habitual drunkenness” (Saltz, 1993). However, 
once automobiles became more popular, the focus was tightened to “visibly intoxicated” 
patrons.  With liquor liability laws, also known as dram shop liability, alcohol servers are 
held responsible for harm that an intoxicated or underage patron causes.  However, liability 
does not end with the servers.  Dram shop liability laws were first created to resolve the issue 
of compensating the victim(s) in an impaired driving related incident (Saltz, 1993).  
However, since advocacy organizations, such as MADD was formed in the 1980s, dram shop 
liability is now seen as a preventative tool.  Dram shop liability laws are now used with 
server intervention programs to prevent the occurrence of impaired driving Bars, clubs, and 
any supplier(s) of alcohol can be held liable for harm in third-party liability suits which may 
be result in a criminal or civil trial depending on the nature of the harm inflicted.  
There are varying forms of dram shop liability laws.  Some states have licensing rules that 
state a business cannot sell alcoholic beverages to a visibly intoxicated person.  If they do, 
their business license can be suspended or revoked.  These suits, though rare, come about 
because of the limits in the amount insurance companies can pay.   If a drunk driver or 
his/her insurance company is unable to pay for all damages, the commercial server is then 
called upon to pay the remaining damages.  In Utah, a person can collect up to $500,000 per 
injury per incident from a tavern with a maximum total amount of $1 million (Dillon and 
Bernick, 2001). Other states do not have a statute on dram shop liability.  Rather, they are 
enforced through common law based on precedence in court decisions (Saltz, 1993).  In a 
liability case in Iowa, the case report states “individuals, drunk or sober, were responsible for 
their own torts” (Smith, 2000).   The report continues to state that a dramshop can only be 
held liable if they serve the underage or a visibly intoxicated person.  The same occurs in 
Colorado, Florida, Ohio, and Utah (Smith, 2000).  
4.1.4.1 Limitations 
Insurance companies offering liability insurance do not appear to consider in their premium 
estimates for drinking establishments improved performance of alcohol servers recognizing 
visibly intoxicated persons (Saltz, 1993).  Premiums remain high and as a result, many 
drinking establishments choose not to pay for liability insurance.  To remedy this problem, 
Saltz (1993) and Mosher (1984) suggests putting in place an incentive of lowering liability if 
a drinking establishment had exhibited responsible beverage service.  The Oregon Restaurant 
and Bar Association (ORBA) originally had proposed this solution in a bill. However, it was 
later removed due to pressures from trial lawyers and the bill was never passed with the 
proposed provision.    
4.1.5 Alcohol Server Training 
Approximately 40% of all impaired driving incidents begin in a licensed drinking 
establishment (NHTSA, 2005).    Preventative efforts have therefore been made to promote 
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responsible drinking in drinking establishments.  Some of these preventative efforts have 
been spearheaded by the alcohol-control agencies.  However, in some cases, the alcoholic 
beverage industry and restaurant associations have gone beyond what has been required by 
alcohol-control agencies to prevent impaired driving.  In others, the alcoholic beverage 
industry and restaurant association are concerned with the cost of server training, especially 
due to high turnover, and are against putting in place further regulations pertaining to the 
drinking establishment (Saltz, 1993). In an evaluation of 11 studies that contained data on 
drinking locations gathered through post-accident, post-DUII arrest, and BAC roadside 
surveys, O’Donnell (1985) found that 40% to 63% of persons arrested who had taken a 
roadside-survey had a BAC exceeding 0.10 and 26% of impaired drivers involved in a crash 
had departed from a drinking establishment before driving.  
The most common prevention strategy has involved educating servers of the effects of 
alcohol and the alcohol beverage control laws so they can prevent patrons from consuming 
too much alcohol and becoming overly impaired.  These programs may also be called 
Responsible Beverage Service (RBS) programs (Mosher et al., 2002) and server integration 
programs.  Servers can respond to impaired patrons by offering them food or delaying 
service to slow alcohol absorption by the body.  Servers can refuse service.  They can also 
prevent patrons from driving while impaired by arranging alternative transportation. Oregon 
was the first state to introduce server training in December 1986.  Single-vehicle nighttime 
traffic crashes were significantly reduced by December 1989 (Holder and Wagenaar, 1994).  
In California and in several other states, server integration programs have been explored 
(Shults et al., 2001).  A national survey of adults 18 and over found that 89% and 88% of the 
population were in favor of mandating server and manager training, respectively (Wagenaar 
et al., 2000).  
To address effective server training, Toomey et al. (1998) evaluated 24 server training 
programs nationwide. They found that management support was essential in preventing 
underage and intoxicated patrons.  In server training, the perceptions of the norm with 
regards to refusing service, laws, policies and procedures of the establishment, and 
understanding the social support for specific types of preventative and proactive 
interventions are important as well as their consequences.  Training programs that 
incorporate role playing to try to change patron behavior have been effective.  Finally, the 
presentation of server training should be interesting, employing different education methods 
such as video, discussion, and role playing.  Finally, although no legal mandate occurs, water 
may be provided to patrons at drinking establishments as part of server responsibility.  The 
effectiveness of the above practices has not been scientifically evaluated.  
4.1.5.1 Limitations 
One problem identified with server intervention programs is that there is currently no 
standard training program for server education.  Many educators meet state alcohol-control 
agencies minimum requirements, but training methods may vary in amount of time, delivery 
method and content covered.  This makes it difficult to compare and evaluate server 
intervention programs.  Having a state-wide mandatory training program may help to 
decrease traffic crashes (Toomey and Wagenaar, 1999 and Mosher et al., 2002).  The 
Responsibility Hospitality Council, an organization dedicated to promoting the responsible 
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sale and service of alcoholic beverages, has worked to develop standards to help set policy on 
server training (Saltz, 1993).  
4.1.6 Underage Drinking 
The youth has often been a targeted population for impaired driving initiatives.  Although 
many states had minimum legal drinking age (MLDA) laws starting in the 1970s (Dee and 
William, 2001), the MLDA law, passed through the National Minimum Purchase Age Act, 
was enacted nationwide in 1984.  In general, MLDA laws “makes it illegal for any person 
who is less than 21 years old to purchase, possess, or consume alcoholic beverages or to 
misrepresent their age to obtain such beverages” (NHTSA and NIAA, 2000). MLDA laws 
have been effective in reducing crashes.  Sweedler (1995) found that in 1980, 53% of all 
teenage drivers killed in crashes had a BAC of over 0.10.  In 1987, this percentage was 
reduced to 28%.  Zwerling, and Jones (1999) reported the percentage was reduced to 21% in 
1996.  From 1993 to 2001, the number of college students who drank alcohol decreased from 
81% to 77.4%.  However the occurrence of binge drinking increased in those same years 
from 21.3% to 23.5%. Other benefits of the MLDA laws include a decrease in alcohol 
consumption and improved health (Wechsler et al., 2002).   
The zero tolerance law, which makes it illegal for persons under 21 to drink and operate a 
motor vehicle, was enacted nationwide in 1998 (Ferguson. and Williams, 2002). States differ 
in enforcing the law, varying from an arrest or BAC test as in New Mexico, Texas, Florida, 
Main, and Oregon, to only obtaining a preliminary breath test as in California.  The 
consequences are typically a license suspension or revocation and monetary payments, 
gradually getting more severe on subsequent offenses. Zero tolerance laws have been found 
to be effective.  Zwerling and Jones (1999) conducted a study of six controlled studies which 
evaluated the impact of various laws limiting underage drinking (20 years of age and 
younger).   Half of the studies were from Australia and the other half were from the United 
States.  Although the results in the studies were statistically insignificant, all showed 
reductions in the number of injuries and crashes.  The study was limited in that the studies 
selected had occurred from 1984 to 1994 and during this time other laws may have 
influenced the outcome. However, zero tolerance laws are most effective when coupled with 
public information and education campaigns.  Blomberg (1992) found that in Maryland, the 
zero tolerance law resulted in a statewide 11% reduction in crashes among underage drivers.  
In six counties, public information and education campaigns were conducted.  The result was 
a 21% reduction in crashes before the campaign and 36% after the campaign.  
4.1.6.1 Limitations 
Problems encountered with the various laws to prevent underage drinking include the 
paperwork involved in enforcement practices. It was suggested by Ferguson and Williams 
(2002) that the simple forms, such as used in California are easier to use than longer forms, 
as in New York. Law enforcement officers frequently complained about the long forms as a 




4.2.1 Police Enforcement  
Police enforcement plays a major role in reducing DUII related incidents.  When an 
enforcement officer observes a driver suspected of impaired driving they will likely initiate a 
traffic stop if probable cause is present. The officer will pull the driver over and ask them to 
take a standardized field sobriety test.  Police departments with dedicated DUII officers may 
have a significant impact on impaired driving.  For example, the Austin Police Department 
has a dedicated unit of officers who handle DUII enforcement.  These officers have dedicated 
enforcement decals on their patrol cars (Stuster, 2006).  The presence of the special impaired 
driving unit resulted in a 25% decrease in alcohol-involved fatal crashes between 1997 and 
2001 and a 10% increase in the conviction rate of impaired drivers.  
An enforcement method used in many states is sobriety checks in select locations.  A sobriety 
check usually works where law enforcement officers set up a checkpoint, stop drivers, and 
assess their degree of alcohol impairment.  Either random breath testing (RBT) and selective 
breath testing (SBT) is used at sobriety checkpoints.  RBT checkpoints are usually conducted 
in Australia and other European countries.  SBT checkpoints are conducted in the United 
States due to issues about the violation of constitutional rights which limit the number of 
RBT checkpoints (Shults, 2001).  Shults et al. (2001) conducted a review of a variety of 
sobriety checkpoint studies.  Of 15 studies pertaining to the effectiveness of SBT checkpoints 
and 17 pertaining to RBT checkpoints, the number of alcohol-involved crashes decreased 
from 16% to 24%.  The study did not find a difference in the effectiveness between SBT and 
RBT checkpoints.   
The sobriety checkpoint system is advantageous in that the purpose is not to catch drunk 
drivers, but to discourage the public from driving impaired.  Sobriety checks are an effective 
enforcement measure, especially for law enforcement programs without a sufficient number 
of law enforcement officers to enforce impaired driving laws.  They also allow for media 
coverage, thereby increasing the visibility of the operation in the hopes of deterring drivers 
from drinking and driving.  California is one state that uses the sobriety checkpoint system. 
In Los Angeles County, an “Avoid the 50” program was established among 50 law 
enforcement agencies, supported by the California Office of Traffic Safety.  Special 8-hr 
DUII patrols are conducted by at least 50 officers each month and sobriety checkpoints 
conducted throughout the year to create public awareness.  Alcohol-involved injury crashes 
declined by 34% between 2002 and 2003, compared to a 6% increase nationwide.  Alcohol-
involved fatal crashes declined by 56% compared to a 2% decline in California and 3% 
nationwide (Stuster, 2006).  Fresno Police Department (also in California) has a similar 
program.  Alcohol-involved injury and fatal crashes declined by 17.4% and all alcohol-
related crashes declined by 25%, compared to a 6% increase in alcohol-related crashes 
nationwide (Stuster, 2006).  
Instead of utilizing sobriety checkpoints, other states may use saturation patrols.  In 
saturation patrols a command center is set up, usually in a parking lot, where persons arrested 
for impaired driving are taken to for testing.  In Maricopa County, Arizona, the East Valley 
DUI Task Force has conducted visible, large scale saturation patrols since 1983.  Large 
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special saturation vehicles are parked in parking lots.  Although breath tests are administered, 
officers are trained to draw blood and have the support of an on staff judge to provide a 
warrant to force a blood draw as needed.  Alcohol-involved fatal crashes declined by 14% in 
2002, compared to 2% in other areas of the County and an increase of 3% nationwide 
(Stuster, 2006).  Several other states researched by Stuster (2006) that conducted sobriety 
checkpoints and saturation patrols all revealed decreases in alcohol-related crashes.  
4.2.1.1 Limitations 
One challenge for law enforcement is that when administering a breath test, the device tests 
only for alcohol use.  A driver may be impaired because they have taken a drug other than 
alcohol.  In this case, the breath results will show up with a 0.00 BAC.  In some states, a 
Drug Evaluation and Classification (DEC) Program counters this problem by certifying 
offers to become Drug Recognition Experts (DRE).  Certified officers can arrest and convict 
drivers who show symptoms of impairment due to drug use (Talpins and Hayes, 2004).  The 
program was started by the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) in the early 1970s, but 
became a federal program in the early 1980s.  As of 2004, 37 states and the District of 
Columbia have a DEC Program.  A study in New York in 1994 found the most commonly 
found single drug was cannabis at 59% (NHTSA, 1996). In 1993, Arizona Department of 
Public Safety Central Regional Crime Laboratory conducted a study to determine the impact 
of the DREs in getting impaired drivers off the road. Of all drivers arrested and prosecuted, 
approximately 33% had consumed alcohol and 5% had a BAC of 0.10 or higher (NHTSA, 
1996). Few sources were available indicating funding sources for enforcement.  However, in 
New York, enforcement efforts take up about 60% of all available DWI resources (Williams 
et al., 2005). 
4.3 ADJUDICATION 
4.3.1 Court Programs 
Persons arrested for impaired driving often go through an adjudication process and are issued 
sanctions. The goals of such sanctioning programs are to reduce the recidivism rate of DUII 
offenders. Typical sanctions for persons arrested and/or convicted of a DUII include paying a 
fine, serving jail time, and getting their license suspended or revoked (Jones et al., 1996). In 
Oregon, evaluation and treatment is mandated as part of the conviction. New York has a 
comprehensive DUII program known as STOP-DWI.  Created in 1981, STOP-DWI is a 
comprehensive, unique and statewide alcohol and highway safety program sustained by 
funds from DWI and driving while ability-impaired (DWAI).  DWI occurs when the driver 
has a BAC of 0.08 or greater.  DWAI occurs when a driver has a BAC of 0.05 or greater.  To 
keep offenders in the system and to tract recidivism, drivers arrested and convicted for DWI 
or DWAI may not have their convictions dropped to a non-alcohol offense.  The program has 
been successful in reducing alcohol-involved fatalities by 54% from 1131 fatalities in 1982 
to 520 fatalities in 2002. T he alcohol-involved fatality rates per 100 million VMT was 0.36 
versus 0.61 for the United States (Williams et al., 2005).   
Some states offer offenders to substitute community service for jail time (Jones et al., 1996).  
This is done oftentimes because jail space is limited.  Known as intermediate sanctions 
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programs (Lord, 2001), these programs include community service, intensive supervision, 
boot camps, house arrest, electronic monitoring and day-reporting centers (McDonald, 1987). 
Other strategies recommended by Hedlund and McCartt (2002) include controlling offenders 
closely during probation, using home detention and electronic monitoring, or jailing 
offenders as appropriate.  These strategies are explored in other parts of this section. Finally, 
problems with court sanctions are not well known because many states do not have good 
record systems (Hedlund and McCartt, 2002). 
Electronic monitoring is used for offenders who are on house arrest and was first used in 
1984 (Skelton and Renzema, 1990).  Offenders typically have to wear an electronic band 
around their wrist or ankle.  Communication between the offender and probation office can 
vary. Some devices can send continuous signals.  Others devices work using random phone 
calls made by the probation officer.   Others work by transmitting photos to the office (Jones 
et al., 1996). Los Angeles County, CA has had an electronic monitoring program for repeat 
offenders convicted of a DUII since October 1992.  Offenders do not face jail time, but are 
monitored at home.  They have to wear a transmitter on a band tied to their ankle.  Up to 50 
offenders start the program each month and pay at least $15 a day for ISP.   Recidivism using 
the EM program was reduced by about 1/3 after 1 year of the program.  The cost of the 
program was minimal because it was paid for by the participants.   
 
Instead of incarcerating offenders, some states have set up special “DWI jails” (Jones et al., 
1996).  These can be weekend programs where the offenders perform acts of community 
service.  These programs may require the offender to live at a certain place for awhile.  For 
example, young people often are sent to boot camps where they are educated under strict 
conditions.  Other offenders may go to Dedicated Detention Centers (DD), where they can 
live and receive counseling and treatment.  Similarly, Day Reporting Centers (DRC) provides 
education and counseling services, but is not intended for residential living.  
 
4.3.1.1 Limitations 
Hedlund and McCartt (2002) observed that administrative sanctions do little to curb impaired 
driving and sanctions are not always applied consistently.  Some state laws allow for 
offenders to escape payment of fines or an impaired driving conviction through a plea 
bargain (not Oregon).   
4.3.2 License Suspension or Revocation 
License suspensions are a common and effective way to reduce the occurrence of alcohol-
involved crashes by removing those who have the highest potential to drink and drive.  
Another possible method used to reduce impaired driving offenses is administrative license 
revocations (ALR).  An ALR can be issued when law enforcement officers stop a vehicle and 
the offender either refuses to take a drug test or fails one and is therefore arrested.  In some 
states, the license is seized upon a DUII conviction.  When the offender’s license is taken 
away, the state Department of Motor Vehicles will suspend the offenders’ license for a 
period of time depending on the outcome of the trial.  As of 2002, 40 out of 50 states have 
ALR laws (Voas and DeYoung, 2002). New York’s STOP-DWI program includes a Judicial 
Per Se License Revocation law (Section 1193[2](e)(7)a of the Vehicle and Traffic Law) 
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which requires a “mandatory loss of license if a driver takes a breath test and registers a score 
of 0.08 percent or greater, his or her driver license is suspended no later than the conclusion 
of arraignment” (Williams et al., 2005). Other states have Administrative License Revocation 
(ALR) laws that will temporarily provide a 15-day license until a hearing can be scheduled. 
   
4.3.2.1 Limitations  
The drawback to such programs is that many of these drivers continue to drive without a 
license.  The only time enforcement officers know of someone who is violating a driving 
while suspended (DWS) law is if they the officers stops a vehicle for a traffic violation.  
Also, because offenders often use their vehicle as a way of getting to work, many courts have 
granted offenders a hardship or occupational license, allowing the offender to drive on a 
limited basis.  This would include to and from work, and during daytime hours only.  
Studies have shown that the rate of first time offenders with suspended licenses who drive is 
high.  From fall 2001 to fall 2002, McCartt et al. (2003) studied the extent to which first time 
offenders drove while having a suspended license.  First time DUII convicted offenders in 
the City of Milwaukee, Wisconsin and Bergen County, New Jersey.  The penalties for first 
time DWI offenses and DWS / DWR differed.  In Wisconsin, mandatory minimum 
administrative and court suspension penalties existed.  However, DWS / DWR penalties were 
not mandatory.  In New Jersey, administrative and court suspension penalties were not 
mandatory.  Offenders were not allowed to obtain hardship licenses and there were 
substantial penalties for a DWS / DWR.  In both study areas, offenders were either not 
eligible to receive hardship licenses or hardship licenses applied only a minimal number of 
offenders.  Observations were made of 93 first time DUII offenders (57 in Milwaukee, 36 in 
Bergen County) during their license suspension and after license reinstatement.  Results 
showed 88% of Milwaukee offenders drove while their license was suspended versus 36% in 
Bergen County.  The results showed that administrative license suspensions were effective, 
particular where the state had tougher laws.  However, it only focused on whether or not 
offenders drove.  In another study where offenders were given a survey to complete, 68% of 
the offenders said they had driven while their license was suspended or revoked (Wiliszowski 
et al., 1996).  Most drove for employment or medical reasons.  The frequency of driving 
varied.  What is of importance is that of all offenders, 54% admitted they drove after drinking 
during their penalty period.  This indicates license suspension / revocation programs are not 
effective in reducing impaired driving occurrences.  
Another problem with administrative licenses suspensions is that many licenses are never 
reinstated.  Voas and McKnight (1989) found that approximately 50% of all license 
suspensions are reinstated.  According to Voas and DeYoung (2002), this occurs because of 
either the cost of reinstating a license, consequences of increased insurance for the offender, 
and low probability of apprehension.  If those who are not reinstated still continue to drive, 
especially while intoxicated, this could present problems.  Other sanctioning programs that 
may avoid the problem posed by administrative license suspensions include license plate 
impoundment, cancellation of vehicle registrations, vehicle impoundment or immobilization, 
and the forfeiture of vehicles (Voas and DeYoung, 2002).  
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4.3.3  Repeat Offenders  
Since the 1980s, various agencies and organizations have sought to educate the public of the 
problems of impaired driving.  As a result, the general population today is more aware of the 
consequences of impaired driving.  However, education or threats to punish drivers while 
intoxicated do not appear to reach repeat offenders and chronic drunk drivers. Many 
definitions are used to describe repeat offenders and chronic drunk drivers.  Repeat offenders 
typically refer to drivers who have been previously convicted of a DUII and are facing a 
subsequent conviction.  Chronic drunk drivers are defined by the National Council on 
Alcoholism and Drug Dependence (NCADD) as people with an underlying alcohol problem 
that interferes with their driving as well as other aspects of their life.  These drivers make up 
about 1% of all drivers on weekend nights, but account for about 50% of all fatal crashes 
(NCADD, 2006).  Regardless of the varying definitions used for repeat offenders and chronic 
drunk drivers, the population referred to in this section is best characterized by persons who 
repeatedly drive after drinking, have a very high blood alcohol content, often have been 
previously convicted of an impaired driving offense, and display signs of serious problems 
with alcohol abuse by drinking frequently, to excess or by being resistant to appeals and 
threats to drink less (Health Canada, 1997).   
Several strategies have been used in an attempt to repeat offenders.  Many of these strategies 
or countermeasures are strict, punishing the driver for repeated offenses.  Their effectiveness 
in reducing the occurrence of impaired driving and fatal crashes vary.   In Maine, repeat 
DUII offenders are subject to lower per se BAC limit laws.  Since program implementation, 
the limit has been reduced to “zero tolerance”.  In six years, fatal crashes involving repeat 
DUII offenders decreased by 25%.  The trend is notable because the percent of fatal crashes 
involving repeat DUII offenders in neighboring states increased.  Some states have passed 
laws requiring repeat DUII offenders to install license plates that visibly stand out.  Ohio, 
Iowa, and Minnesota are three states requiring these special license plates (Insurance.com 
website, 2007). Zebra markings were experimented on in two states.  Washington is another 
state that requires zebra stickers (MADD, 2007.   
 
4.3.3.1 Limitations 
In general, a problem is that not all repeat offenders are identified (Hedlund and McCartt, 
2002).  Hedlund and McCartt (2002) suggest screening all drivers to determine if they are a 
chronic drunk driver or repeat offender especially if they have out-of-state convictions.  
 
4.3.4 Intensive Supervision Program (ISP) 
Intensive Supervision Programs are early intervention programs that require offenders take 
treatment shortly after arrest and during the pretrial period with ongoing monitoring and 
supervision.  Milwaukee County, Wisconsin has an ISP.  Started in October, it processes 
about 50 new clients every month  found that the ISP reduced re-arrest recidivism probability 
by about one half after one year of the program (Jones et al., 1996).  At the time of the study, 
the program was not found to be cost effective, despite the savings in reduced jail time. 
 
New Jersey has an intensive supervision program involving 375 to 500 participants at a time.  
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What makes New Jersey’s program unique is that participants must serve at least two months 
in prison before entering the program.  In an evaluation conducted in 1998 (Pearson), the 
New Jersey program was found to reduce the need for limited prison space, was monetarily 
cost-beneficial and cost-effective compared to other incarceration programs, prevented 
criminal behavior, provided counseling, and delivered appropriate, intermediate punishment.  
 
The program is rated medium in strictness by a survey of community justice professionals.  
While in the program, participants must look for a job if unemployed, perform community 
service, and attend counseling sessions.  Participants in the first six months are contacted 
most frequently, with a median monthly number of contacts of 31 per month, 12 face to face 
interviews by ISP officers, 7 curfew checks, and 4 urinalysis checks.  Intermediate and 
advanced participants are contacted less frequently, but still received more contact than 
parole or probation participants.  Supervision in the program is strict and any violation results 
in return to prison.  Approximately 40% to 50% of all participants are returned to prison.  In 
addition to an ISP officer, each participant also has a community sponsor who is nominated 
by the offender and must volunteer their time (Pearson, 1998).   
 
The New Jersey ISP program takes about a year and a half to complete and costs 
approximately $13,000 per offender, an approximate savings of about $7,000 when 
compared to $20,000 for a typical correction period of a prison term.  The program also 
allows the offender to make $10,000 in annual income compared to the $5,000 in annual 
income paroles make.  The program contributes approximately $200,000 in community 
service a year.  Finally, despite the selective screening of the ISP, recidivism rates were 12% 
lower in the two years starting treatment (Pearson, 1998).  
 
 
4.3.5 Vehicle Impoundment or Immobilization 
Related to license suspension or revocation in that they prevent offenders from driving, some 
states impound or immobilize offender’s vehicles at the time of arrest.  When a vehicle is 
impounded, it is taken away from the offender for approximately 30 to 90 days.  This is 
achieved by either taking either the entire vehicle or license plate.  Vehicles can also be 
forfeited and sold by the government.  
Vehicle impoundment laws were passed by many states in 1999 and 2000 (Voas and 
DeYoung, 2002).  Both California and Ohio have effective programs.  Vehicle impoundments 
have been known to cause up to a 25% reduction in alcohol-involved crashes. DeYoung 
(2000) studied the effectiveness of the California impound law through a time series analysis.  
The implementation of the law resulted in a 13.6% reduction in crashes among the offender 
group.  Compared to the 8.6% general reduction of crashes of nonsuspended / nonrevoked 
drivers, the law was not highly effective.  
With regards to vehicle forfeiture, Portland, Oregon had a forfeiture program in 1989  (Voas 
and DeYoung, 2002) for drivers convicted of a DUII or for repeat offenders.  As referenced 
in Voas and DeYoung’s work, in 1995, Crosby evaluated the effectiveness of the program 
between 1990 and 1995.  Using a Cox regression, Crosby was able to determine that the 
offenders who had their vehicles forfeited had a significantly longer time before they were 
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rearrested compared to those who did not have their vehicles forfeited.   
4.3.5.1 Limitations 
The problems associated with vehicle impoundment and immobilization practices include its 
high cost due to towing and vehicle storage, difficulty to enforce and prevent offenders from 
driving other vehicles, and its impact on other family members who may rely on the vehicle 
for their daily needs.  
4.3.6  Ignition Interlock 
The ignition interlock technology consists of alcohol breath testing device or breath alcohol 
ignition interlock device (BAIID) connected to the ignition system of a driver’s vehicle.  To 
start the vehicle, the driver must have a BAC level lower than the specified amount. As the 
offender blows into the device, they can read their own BAC level.  The use of ignition 
interlocks has been targeted primarily at repeat offenders.  In a study conducted by Beck et 
al. (1999) multiple alcohol offenders were studied.   Half of the group was required to go 
through the ignition interlock program.   The other half served as the control group.  The 
offenders were monitored for two years.  Before the start of the program, the mean number of 
alcohol traffic violations did not differ and was at about 3.5 violations.  After two years, 41 
or 5.9% of the ignition interlock group committed another violation while 63 or 9.1% of the 
control group committed a violation.  This result was statistically significant.   
International Alcohol Interlock Programs 
Ignition interlock programs were first introduced in Canada as a pilot program in the 
province of Alberta in 1989.  In 1999, as part of a package of amendments to the sections of 
the Criminal Code of Canada dealing with impaired driving offences, first offenders were 
given the opportunity to reduce the mandatory minimum period of driving prohibition from 
one year to three months by participating in an ignition interlock program. Subsequent 
amendments extended the reductions in the period of prohibition for repeat offenses -- from 
two years to six months for a second offense and from three years to 12 months for 
subsequent offences -- if the offender participated in an interlock program.There are now 
interlock programs in six provinces -- Alberta, Saskatchewan, Manitoba, Ontario, Quebec, 
and Newfoundland and Labrador -- and the Yukon Territory.  These programs are 
administered by the driver licensing authority in the respective province or territory and most 
participants are volunteers who take advantage of the reduction in the period of driving 
prohibition and the opportunity to obtain their license.  
 
There have been some challenges to interlock programs in used in some provinces.  For 
example, the proportion of DWI offenders who elect to participate in interlock programs 
remains relatively low at between 10% and 20%.  That being said, finding ways of enhancing 
the number of participants in interlock programs remains a challenge for every program.   
Many of these jurisdictions are either considering or proceeding with legislation that makes 
participation in the interlock program mandatory, at least for repeat and/or high-risk 
offenders (Bierness et al., 2000). 
 
Starting in 2003, various countries in the European Union (EU) started to devise interlock 
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program trials. The Netherlands Ministry of Transport decided to implement an alcolock 
sometime in 2005.  Similarly, a working group of the Finnish Ministry of Transport also 
presented a proposal for a national alcolock field trial, also set to begin in 2005. By early 
2004, an in-depth qualitative EU field trial began by incorporating small-scale trials in 
Belgium, Germany, Norway and Spain, as well as the start of a 30-month UK field trial 
investigating the social impact of alcolocks on users and their families. 
 
The procedure for the Netherlands trial consisted of a target group of DWI offenders who 
underwent a medical/psychiatric assessment and were declared “not unfit to drive”. This 
group forms approximately 1% of all arrested DWI offenders in the Netherlands. In 2002, 
police apprehended 38,500 DWI offenders; 4000 of these were multiple recidivists or had a 
BAC above 1.8g/l, and had to undergo an assessment. The verdict in 90% of these 
assessments was “unfit to drive”, with the remaining 10% being declared “fit to drive”.  The 
alcolock program would be mandatory under administrative law and will have duration of 
two years with the possibility of a six-month extension. 
 
The program cost per installed alcolock was estimated to be 2,200 Euros. Program costs will 
be divided as 2/3 for DWI offenders and 1/3 by the Ministry of Transport. A future extension 
of the program will include alcohol dependent drivers and DWI offenders with a BAC 
between 1.3 and 1.8g/l BAC, who presently have to attend a 3-day driver improvement 
program, may increase the road safety benefits by a factor of 20.  The initial trial program is 
also designed to reduce post-program recidivism such as integrating driver improvement 
elements for all participants and integrating counseling for drivers who have failed a 
predetermined number of tests. 
 
The estimated effectiveness was based on an outlook of two years after program 
implementation.  It has been estimated that the target group will stabilize at approximately 
800 subjects. The estimated benefit of the program is an annual reduction of 4-5 fatalities, at 
an annual program cost of 0.9 million Euros.   The estimated reduction in road fatalities is 
based on a 65% reduced crash rate for alcolock users (as demonstrated in previous studies). 
However, even at only a 25% reduced crash rate, the alcolock program would still be cost-
efficient. 
 
Victoria, Australia also implemented an interlock program in May of 2003 where interlocks 
became mandatory for all repeat offenders of driving under the influence of alcohol, but can 
also be ordered at the Court’s discretion for first offenders who have committed a serious 
offense. Typical installation period varies from 6 months to 3 years depending on the nature 
of the offense.  The program was set for review of effectiveness in 2005 where an 
“effectiveness evaluation” would follow. However, circumvention had already been found to 
be an issue.  There are some steps that have been taken with the program to reduce 
circumvention.  These include:   
 
• A summary report of the monthly data are used for a compliance assessment that the 
Magistrate can then use when making a decision to remove an interlock.  
• Drivers must provide a “compliant” record in order to demonstrate that the interlock 
device can be safely removed.  
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• Imposing penalties for circumvention that can include fines up to $3000, 
imprisonment up to 4 months or vehicle immobilization for up to 12 months.  
• Financial incentives which include payment of additional charges for 7 day recall 
events. If there is no circumvention or misuse after monthly service, the supplier may 
extend services to 2 or 3 months (Swann). 
 
Western Australia has experienced issues with its alcohol interlock program such as low 
participation rates; Maintaining the effect after the interlock device is removed; Keeping 
drivers within a system of legal control and limiting unlicensed driving; Equality and 
inclusiveness.  The Melanie Hands Injury Research Centre at the University of Western 
Australia has proposed a model for better effectiveness of the program.  This model would 
include all drink driving offenders -- both first time and repeat offenders.  The minimum 
period of program participation would be six months but never less than the original 
disqualification period, while the maximum period would be determined on the basis of 
performance—thus rewarding compliance.  Assessment would be required of all repeat 
offenders and those with high BACs and those identified with serious alcohol problems 
would be referred to a remedial program. Their success in rehabilitation and the interlock 
program would be monitored. 
 
Importantly, an effort would be made to get offenders into the interlock program as soon as 
possible after the drink driving offence in an attempt to balance the risks of unlicensed 
driving with the benefits of interlocks.  Also, the Research Center has recommended an 
option of deferring the fine for an offence to offset the cost of the interlock and remedial 
program. The fine would be waived following successful completion of the programs and 
reinstated in cases where the offender failed to complete the program and alternative 
sanctions would be imposed. The model also includes the stipulation that participation 
always be coupled with a requirement to participate in a remedial program -- either brief 
intervention or treatment (Melanie Hands Injury Research Centre). 
 
4.4 TREATMENT 
4.4.1  Treatment Programs 
Treatment programs typically educate offenders about the impacts of impaired driving. 
Clients of treatment programs are often required to attend as a requirement in the 
adjudication process of a DUII they have received.  However, clients can also be voluntary. 
Treatment programs have been effective in reducing DUII recidivism.  Wells-Parker et al. 
(1995) conducted a meta-analysis, or a statistical analysis to literature review of remediation 
programs pertaining to alcohol treatment, education, psychotherapy, counseling or contact 
probation.  Of 215 DUII studies used, 30 from other countries, researchers identified 71 
critical factors for success or failure of DUI intervention efforts.  The study concluded that 
remediation programs reduced subsequent DUII offenses by 7-9%.  
California legislation requires courts to order the enrollment of persons convicted of a DUI 
into an alcohol / drug education program as a condition of probation.  In 2006, a study was 
conducted, as mandated by AB 1916 (Torlakson), to determine the effectiveness of a 3 month 
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versus 6 month treatment program (Tashima and Daoud, 2006).  Data were collected on 
convictions between July 2003 and June 2004.  Driver records were analyzed to determine 
the proportion of offenders involved in any crash and DUI incidents.  For first DUI 
offenders, the length of time was found to have an insignificant effect on the 1 year 
subsequent crash rates.  The crash rate for 6 month program participants was 2.4% lower 
than for the 3 month program.  However, participants in the 3 month program had 
significantly fewer DUI incidents of about a 28.1% difference compared to participants in the 
6 month program.  This can, however, be explained by presence of more participants in the 6 
month program with higher BAC levels and more likely to recidivate.  In consideration of 
BAC levels, the study was limited to participants with BAC levels of 0.20 or above.  The 
results indicated for this BAC group, the length of an education program had little and 
insignificant effect on crash rates and DUII incidents.  In a similar study conducted by 
DeYoung in 1995, the treatment programs for second offenders from 12 to 18 months had 
little impact in reducing DUII recidivism.  
Other types of treatment include pharmaceutical treatments that treat alcoholism. Drugs, such 
as naltrexone, have been known to prevent alcoholics from drinking to excess. DUII 
offenders could be assigned such treatment programs. No studies were found to illustrate the 
effects of the drug.  
4.4.2 Victim Impact Panels 
Victim Impact Panels were first suggested by MADD in 1982 (Rojek et al., 2003) and meant 
to be used in conjunction with court sanctions.  Victim Impact Panels are meetings offenders 
are required to attend where they listen to stories shared by people who have either been 
involved in an impaired driving incident or lost a loved one in an impaired driving incident. 
These speakers are usually volunteers. Baca et al (2000) conducted a study which compared 
the 5-year recidivism rates of convicted first-time DWI offenders who went through the VIP 
process with those who did not attend the VIP.  Of all Hispanic offenders studied in 
Bernalillo County, New Mexico 5238 were asked to complete an interview.  Statistical tests 
were conducted and results show that referral to VIP did not reduce the rearrest recidivism 
rate.  Another study by Sinar and Compton (1995) showed victim impact panels also did not 
have a significant affect on arrest recidivism rates.  However, the one problem with the 
Shinar and Compton study is that it included repeat offenders, whose behaviors would not 
change (Lord, 2001). There have been a number of other studies that indicate improvements 
in recidivism rates.  For example, in Clackamas County, Oregon, DUII offenders who did not 
attend a victims impact panel, compared to those who did, were found to be three times more 
likely to be rearrested within the first year (O’Laughlin, 1990).  However, this study and 
others showing improvements had results that were either not statistically tested.  
4.4.3 Trauma Care Interventions 
A different type of treatment occurs in the emergency care of hospital patients.  It has been 
discovered that many hospital patients have alcohol and drug problems.  While many health 
care professionals recognize the problem, they do not know what they can do to remedy the 
problem or think that their efforts would be futile.  In Washington, 46% of all ER trauma 
patients were found to have alcohol problems.  They were given a 30 minute motivational 
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interview after release from the hospital.  The interview was followed by a letter sent to the 
patient 30 days later.  The treatment effort after 30 days showed a 47% reduction in hospital 
emergency room visits.  After 1 year, patients were found to reduce their alcohol 
consumption over 3 times more than control patients (National Highway Traffic Safety 
Administration, Emergency Nurses Association, American College of Emergency Physicians, 
2001). This study shows that health care professionals can make an impact in reducing 
alcohol consumption, and therefore a likelihood of reduced occurrences of impaired driving.  
4.5 OTHER 
4.5.1 Data Programs 
The problem of impaired driving involves many organizations, each with a different role and 
objective.  Some states have formed a comprehensive DUII program, supported by strong 
leadership. State transportation, health, law enforcement, motor vehicle, and justice 
departments should work together (Hedlund and McCartt, 2002) in a task force to monitor 
the DUII program.  
California is the only state in the United States who has a DUII Information Management 
System. In 1989, the Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) was required to “establish and 
maintain a data and monitoring system to evaluate the efficacy of intervention programs for 
persons convicted to provide accurate and up-to-date comprehensive statistics to enhance the 
ability of the Legislature to make informed and timely policy decisions” (Tashima and 
Helander, 2005). The state of California has a DUI management information system (DUI-
MIS) that tracks the processing of offenders through the DUI system from the point of arrest 
and to identify the frequency with which offenders flow through each branch of the system 
process (from law enforcement through adjudication to treatment and license control actions) 
(Tashima and Daoud, 2006). The information system includes a data flow to tract resources 
for a more detailed understanding, improved management, and evaluation of the DUI 
process.  The California DUI-MIS model has contributed to a national initiative to design a 
model DUI reporting system under NHTSA.  Other states have developed similar DUI 
systems, but these systems may not be as comprehensive.  
 
4.6 CONCLUSION 
Many parties are involved in reducing the impact of driving under the influence of 
intoxicants.  Alcoholic beverage control agencies and liquor control commissions are 
responsible for, with the support of the restaurant associations, store associations, and 
beverage industry, controlling the manufacture, distribution, and sale of alcoholic beverages.  
Public agencies and liquor control commissions are also involved in enforcing jointly with 
law enforcement officers the responsible sale and service of alcoholic beverages in drinking 
establishments and retail stores.  Law enforcement officers have an added enforcement 
responsibility of maintaining public safety through their efforts to identify, contain, and arrest 
impaired drivers, bicyclists, and pedestrians.  Offenders who have been arrested for DUII 
will face either a violation or a conviction on their driving record.  In addition, through 
prosecution, they will face either diversion or be processed for a DUII as a misdemeanor or 
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felony depending on how many DUII offenses they have committed in the past and the 
severity of the incident.  All offenders are required to go through a treatment program.  
Where offenders are identified by hospital personnel, some are provided with motivational 
interviews or referred to law enforcement officers for follow up.  Many hospitals also are 
involved in treatment and education efforts.  Finally, other parties, such as alternative 
transportation organizations, colleges, and non-profit organizations aid efforts to reduce the 
impact of driving under the influence through specialized programs. 
4.6.1 Best Practices 
Through a literature review, several best practices which have been cited from research 
studies an effective means of reducing the frequency and impact of impaired driving and  
reducing alcohol-involved crash rates include controlling the availability of alcoholic 
beverages, minimum legal drinking age and zero tolerance laws, dedicated DUII officers, 
utilizing sobriety checkpoints, utilizing saturation patrols, utilizing ignition interlock, vehicle 
impoundment and immobilization, intensive supervision programs, general treatment 
programs, and motivational interviews in hospitals.  
 
• Targeted marketing of the impacts and issues of intoxicated driving is more effective 
that traditional general public service announcements which have not been shown to 
noticeably change drinking behavior.  
• Controlling access to alcohol can be effective since nearly 40% of all impaired 
driving incidents begin in a licensed establishment. Judiciously managing the number 
of licenses and establishments, as well cooperative efforts to reward well-managed 
establishments may be a way to reduce impaired driving.  Excise taxes, particularly 
on beer, have also been shown to have a reduce alcohol sales and consumption.     
• Zero-tolerance laws for underage drivers can be effective. Minimum legal drinking 
age laws and zero tolerance laws were enacted in the 1970s and 1980s, respectively.  
These laws have been extensively evaluated and have shown reductions in teenagers 
killed in alcohol-involved crashes of up to 25%.     
• Well-funded and strategic enforcement is key ingredient to the long-term success of 
combating impaired driving.  Police departments with dedicated DUII officers have 
made a significant impact on impaired driving.  Saturation patrols coupled with media 
coverage have also been effective.     
• Ignition interlocks – devices which require the driver to pass a breath test prior to 
starting the vehicle and at random intervals – can be effective at targeting repeat 
offenders.  Ignition interlocks have been shown to reduce violations by 4% when 
compared to a control group, and reduce crash rates by 25%. Electronic monitoring 
and house arrest are used in many states as a way to free up jail space and allow 
offenders to reduce recidivism rates.    
• Intensive supervision programs have been proven to be somewhat cost effective 
(varying research results), but effective in reducing recidivism rates by 12% in two 
years after the start of treatment.  ISP program usually only have the resources to 
handle the most severe cases are handled.  ISP program has been known to be 
effective in contributing to community service, helping offenders find jobs with 
usually higher paying annual salaries, and freeing up some jail space.  
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• Treatment programs have been known to be effective in reducing recidivism by 7% - 
9%.  Research indicates treatment programs that are tailored to the individual where 
the individual has one point of contact have been observed to be more effective in 
reducing recidivism.   
• Up to 50% of all ER trauma patients have been found to have some alcohol problem.  
In many trauma centers, motivational interviews are conducted when a patient is 
released from the hospital and followed up 30 days, to a year later.  These interviews 
have resulted in a 47% reduction in hospital emergency room visits.  In addition, 
patients who were surveyed reported their alcohol use was reduced three times 
compared to a control group.   
 
4.6.2 Promising Practices 
Through a literature review on best practices, some practices were found to lack studies 
demonstrating effectiveness in research, but still were considered best practices. These 
promising practices include dram shop liability laws, requiring server training programs, 
enforcing underage drinking, administrative sanctions, special “DWI Jails”, special license 
plates, victims impact panels, pharmaceutical treatments, and DUII data management 
systems.  
 
• Enforcement of dram shop liability vary widely from state to state.  Some states have 
dram shop liability laws.  However, in most states, dram shop liability is enforced 
through common law based on precedence in court decisions.  In these states, a dram 
shop can be held liable for damages inflicted by the intoxicated person.  However, 
many states limit the scope to their responsible share and do not extend damages to 
the victim’s family members or have a cap on the amount dram shops pay.  
 
• Many alcoholic beverage agencies require that servers in drinking establishments be 
trained to responsibility serve alcohol.  While this is a common practice, no research 
has been conducted demonstrating its effectiveness.  Despite the lack of research, 
restaurant associations and the beverage industry are dedicated to promote the 
responsible sale and service of alcoholic beverages and are working to develop 
standards to help establish policy on server training.  
 
• Special “DWI jails” or boot camps have been used to address repeat offenders where 
the offender is monitored under strict and close supervision.  These programs are 
expensive to start and maintain, and little research has been conducted to determine 
its effectiveness on reducing the impact of driving under the influence of intoxicants.  
 
• Victim impact panels were first suggested by MADD in 1982.  While they result in 
positive testimony from offenders who have gone through the presentation, research 
results show mixed results from doing little to reduce the rearrest recidivism rate to 
reducing rearrest recidivism rates by three times when compared to a control group.  
None of the research results were statistically tested.   
 
• Pharmaceutical treatments have been given to some offenders to prevent habitual 
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drinkers from drinking to access.  Research studies on these treatments are relatively 
new and the effectiveness of treatment is unknown.   
 
• Public information and education campaigns have not been extensively evaluated to 
determine its effectiveness in reducing the impacts of impaired driving.  However, 
mass campaigns have been criticized for being ineffective because they do not 
directly impact the actions of an individual while they are drinking.  These campaigns 
ignore the fact that people’s behavior is shaped by their social environment.  Social 
marketing strategies, such as providing attractive transportation options to people 
who are intoxicated, are still relatively new as applied to reducing impaired driving, 
but shows promise in reducing alcohol-involved crashes.   
 
• Many of the research studies evaluated in this literature review lacked adequate data.  
With the large number of parties involved, each party with a distinct and different 
role and objective, a comprehensive DUII data management system may be a first 
step in combating the DUII problem.  Currently, California is the only state in the 
United States who has a DUII Information Management System.  No research has 
been conducted to determine its effectiveness in reducing recidivism or alcohol-
involved crashes.  
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5.0 POTENTIAL STRATEGIES 
This chapter provides a synthesis knowledge of current trends, best practices, and current 
Portland practices and feedback from the DUII Working Group.  For each identified possible 
strategy, a cost and effectiveness rank of low, medium, or high is assigned.  The cost ranking 
is low if implementation of the strategy is less than $150,000, medium if between $150,000 
and $300,000 and high if over $300,000.  The costs should be considered general estimates. 
The cost ranking is based on how much funds from the DUII Working Group could be 
applied towards implementation of the strategy. The scope of the solution will determine the 
total costs. It should be noted that some strategies, for example those that involve private 
parties, are difficult for a group such as the DUII Working Group to help fund.  The 
effectiveness ranking is based on the potential to reduce alcohol-related (or to some extent 
intoxicant-related) crashes.  The effectiveness ranking is low if implementation of the 
strategy results in a crash reduction of less than 5%, medium if 5% to 10%, and high if above 
10%.  These crash reduction percentages are based on best practice research results. 
 
The interaction between the four focus areas represented in Figure 59 represent both a 
challenge and opportunity. It is clear that modifications that improve or modify one focus 
area will have impacts in another. For example, an increase in enforcement activities will 
require more court resources and presumably more treatment resources. This is important to 
remember when considering strategies. 
 
 














5.1.1 Public Education and Media Campaigns 
5.1.1.1 Increase funding for youth specific education 
COST = LOW EFFECTIVENESS = LOW 
This strategy was rated low cost because it would 
pertain only to a select segment of the 
population. 
 
This strategy was rated low on the effectiveness 
scale at reducing alcohol-involved crashes 
because research was unclear on effectiveness 
and there is limited research. 
 
 
Mass public information and education programs have been known to be less than effective 
when aimed at the general public.  Instead of directing education programs at the general 
public, a directed approach yields for a more effective impact. Like successful marketing, the 
information should contain a clear message and actions that one can take.  In the prevention 
focus area, one target group identified by the DUII Working Group is the youth population.  
Currently, youth education is provided by the Multnomah County Sherriff’s Office (Every 15 
Minutes Program) and Legacy Health System (Trauma Nurses Talk Tough, Not My Kid 
Campaign, Insight Class, and MIP class).  All of these classes, with the exception of the MIP 
class can be attended without an order from the court.  The problem present in providing 
youth education is funding for the classes.  Many programs have been cancelled due to 
budget cuts.  In depth evaluations have not been conducted because of the high cost such 
evaluations would require.  Despite the lack of research, youth education is still a 
recommended strategy since it is one of few options available to prevent youths from 
becoming habitual drinkers.  
 
5.1.1.2 Expand education to include personal risks of intoxication for 
pedestrians and bicyclists 
COST = LOW EFFECTIVENESS = LOW 
This strategy was rated low cost because it would 
pertain only to a select segment of the 
population. However, advocacy groups needed 
are likely willing to participate.  
 
This strategy was rated low on the effectiveness 
scale at reducing alcohol-involved crashes 
because research was unclear on effectiveness 
and there is limited research. 
 
 
The primary concern of the bicycle community is the powerlessness of resolving vehicular 
impaired driving. Many active bicyclists are aware of the additional risk to imposed by DUII 
drivers and make conscious decisions not to ride their bicycle particularly on nights and 
weekends (Bicyclist DUII Survey, 2006). Strategies to reduce motor vehicle impaired driving 
should improve these perceptions. However, there are also risks one takes with traveling 
intoxicated under any mode. The data indicate that often times intoxicated pedestrians are at 
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elevated risk and in some recent cases for cyclist. Education campaigns could highlight that 
impairment can cause problems for any mode. 
 
 
5.1.1.3 Deliver education campaigns in a more appealing manner integrated 
within the existing system.  
COST = LOW EFFECTIVENESS = LOW 
This strategy was rated low cost because it would 
pertain only to a select segment of the 
population.  The strategy would most likely 
involve small changes to an existing system.  
 
This strategy was rated low on the effectiveness 
scale at reducing alcohol-involved crashes 
because research was preliminary on 
effectiveness and there is limited research. 
 
 
Current research on education campaigns indicates mass public information and education 
campaigns may not be effective (NCHRP, 2007).  In addition to focusing on specific target 
groups, particularly those who are most at risk of habitual and impaired drinking, campaigns 
can be more effective.  In addition, research has indicated campaigns are more effective 
when integrated into the activities of the drinking population through social marketing 
approaches. Education campaigns through programs delivering appealing  
 
The target population, particularly individuals between 21 to 34 years of age, is presented 
with appealing options during the time period they have to make a decision while 
intoxicated.  When presented with an appealing option, they may also be made more aware 
of enforcement activities.   The best education programs would accomplish reductions 
through positive and more effective social marketing approaches integrated into the existing 
impaired driving system.  When presented with a wide range of options, most individuals 
select the option that provides them with what they feel provides them with the maximum 
benefit.  Recent examples of this approach include a program where young males were 
targeted in a ride-home program using high-end transportation options. Research, though still 
preliminary, shows a 17% decrease in crashes through the provision of luxury vehicles to 
transport intoxicated individuals home. Regardless of the program, social marketing, 
“make(s) the environment more favorable for desired behavior, value can be created, 
communicated and delivered” (Rothschild, Matsin and Miller, 2006).   
 
5.1.2 Access to Alcohol 
5.1.2.1 Promote responsible sale of alcoholic beverages 
COST = LOW EFFECTIVENESS = LOW 
This strategy was rated low cost because the 
responsible beverage sale program is already in 
place. The strategy would require annual 
investment. 
 
This strategy was rated low on the effectiveness 
scale at reducing alcohol-involved crashes 
because although research indicates positive 
results, research is limited.  
 
Using a team approach with members of the DUII Working Group, more emphasis could be 
75 
 
placed on prevention efforts on the part of the restaurant association and beverage industry. 
Currently, servers are taught to recognize the signs of a visibly intoxicated patron for alcohol. 
However, this could be expanded to signs of alcohol and drug impairment.  This could also 
be expanded to include clerks in retail stores. Restaurant association, beverage industry, and 
retail store owners support is needed so the server feels comfortable about refusing alcoholic 
sale or service to minors, visibly intoxicated patrons.  
 
The Oregon Neighborhood Store Association (ONSA) indicates only approximately 5% of 
their members participate in the OLCC Responsible Vendor Program.  The Responsible 
Vendor Program targets sales to minors at retail outlets. By qualifying and then participating 
in the program, vendors, retail and drinking establishments, are eligible for reduced sanctions 
if their employees sell to minors.  Although the participation rate of only one retail store 
organization is known, it still indicates a need to improve promote so more vendors are 
encouraged to apply and comply with the Responsible Vendor Program.  Support from the 
Oregon Restaurant Association and other beverage industry partners are encouraged. 
 
Server and clerk training go hand in hand with enforcement.  Increased resources in OLCC, 
police enforcement, as well as the restaurant association and beverage industry at drinking 
establishments and retail stores could be invested. A coordinated effort would go a long way 
to increase communication between impaired driving parties, but also to show the drinking 
population and those involved in it that there are no loop holes from which to try to avoid 
penalties such as suspension or revocation of permits and licenses. Efforts here could also 
limit youth access to alcohol. 
 
5.1.2.2 Expand OLCC’s Clerk Training Program 
COST = MEDIUM EFFECTIVENESS = LOW 
This strategy was rated medium cost because it 
would require additional funding to support clerk 
training. 
 
This strategy was rated low on the effectiveness 
scale at reducing alcohol-involved crashes 
because research is limited.  
 
The OLCC’s Clerk Training Program (OAR 845-009-0145) rule states that “If a clerk sells 
alcohol to a minor, or fails to properly verify a customer's age, the clerk must complete an 
approved training program” (OLCC, 2007).  The program could be expanded to require 
vendors to train all clerks prior to the start of work.  Research indicating the effectiveness of 




5.1.3 Alternative Transportation 
5.1.3.1 Provide alternative transportation programs 
COST = LOW EFFECTIVENESS = MEDIUM 
This strategy was rated low cost because it would 
require only a start up cost from the DUII Working 
Group. 
 
This strategy was rated medium on the 
effectiveness scale at reducing alcohol-involved 
crashes because some research indicates 
positive results.   
 
The DUII Working Group identified a creative proposal to address impaired driving through 
the abundant transportation options available especially in the downtown Portland area.  
Research already indicates alternative transportation programs may be up to 17% effective in 
reducing alcohol-involved crashes.  An alternative transportation program in Portland is 
RideOnPortland, a non-profit offering the services of driving a person’s vehicle home from a 
drinking location.   
 
5.1.3.1 Provide transit alternatives late at night 
COST = HIGH EFFECTIVENESS = LOW 
This strategy was rated high cost because TriMet 
has indicated in the past of the expensive. 
 
This strategy was rated low on the effectiveness 
scale at reducing alcohol-involved crashes 
because results are unknown.   
 
The DUII Working Group identified a creative proposal to address impaired driving through 
the abundant transportation options available especially in the downtown Portland area.  A 
long standing question has been the availability of late-night transit service. While system-
wide service is likely cost-prohibitive it may be possible to consider some limited service. In 
addition, low cost options like providing cab stands combined with social marketing to target 
key groups (like Seattle) may prove effective. There was not any specific research that 
indicated the effectiveness of any of these strategies.  
 
5.1.4 Medical Care 
5.1.4.1 Encourage consistent application of motivational interviews for hospital 
patients upon discharge and follow up 
COST = MEDIUM EFFECTIVENESS = MEDIUM 
This strategy was rated medium cost because it 
would require additional staffing to handle the 
administrative tasks involved.  
 
This strategy was rated medium on the 
effectiveness scale at reducing alcohol-involved 
crashes because although research indirectly 
relates to crash outcomes, the strategy shows 
promise.  
 
Research indicates motivational interviews result in a 47% reduction in hospital emergency 
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room visits 30 days after the interview and positive results up to a year later. In another study 
of approximately 2500 hospital patients, those with a positive BAC were given a brief 
motivational interview prior to their discharge from the hospital.  This intervention was 
followed up 12 months with another interview.  The recidivism rate to the emergency 
department or trauma service was reduced by 46%. Patients reduced their consumption of 
alcohol by approximately 21.8 drinks with a standard deviation of 3.7 compared to a control 
group of 6.7 drinks with a standard deviation of 5.8.  When following up with patients 3 
years later, readmissions for treatment was reduced by 48% (Gentilello et al., 1999).  
 
Motivational interviews are encouraged as an avenue for further exploration, such as a 
standard part of admission routines.  Trauma centers in Oregon are currently providing 
motivational interviews for the more severe cases.  However the effectiveness of this 
prevention approach is limited due to limited staff or training for existing.  One strategy for 
getting around this barrier is to allow the cost for the interviews to be an insurance billable 
item, especially where patients, unless they were convicted, have no health insurance to help 
pay for medical expenses.   
 
5.2 ENFORCEMENT 
5.2.1 Additional Resources 
5.2.1.1 Increase efforts to lobby for additional funds  
COST = LOW EFFECTIVENESS = LOW 
This strategy was rated low cost because it would 
not require funding from the DUII Working Group. 
 
This strategy was rated low on the effectiveness 
scale at reducing alcohol-involved crashes 
because no clear research exists on the 
effectiveness of increased funding on reducing 
alcohol-involved crashes.   
 
One of the primary areas of concern for the DUII Working Group includes funding.  The 
DUII Working Group identified one area where funding was needed was increased 
enforcement activity by the OLCC enforcement and law enforcement officers. One strategy 
is to increase efforts to lobby for additional funds.  This may be through an increase in the 
beer and wine tax on manufacturers and distributors of alcohol.  Regardless of the type of 
alcoholic beverage the tax is applied, the primary purpose would be to use the increased 
funds for prevention activities. 
 
The idea of increasing the beer and wine tax has been particularly important in strategic 
action towards reducing alcohol consumption among young people.  Saffer and Grossman 
(1987) have found in a six year time series study of alcohol users age 15-24 that taxes on 
liquor cause decreases in the fatal motor vehicle crash rate by serving to reduce alcohol 
consumption.  Compared to all other age groups, users in the 15-24 age group had a death 
rate that was twice as high, corresponding to 45 out of 100,000 fatal outcomes in crashes in 
1980. After an excise tax on beer, the number of deaths fell by 11 out of 100,000, a 21% 




5.2.1.2 Expand OLCC’s Minor Decoy Operations enforcement 
COST = MEDIUM EFFECTIVENESS = MEDIUM 
This strategy was rated medium cost because it 
would not require some start up costs from the 
DUII Working Group for increased staff.  A grant 
could be made to the appropriate agencies.  
 
This strategy was rated medium on the 
effectiveness scale at reducing alcohol-involved 
crashes because although no clear research 
exists, there is still a higher chance of affecting 
the target group.  
 
 OLCC’s Minor Decoy Operations enforces the law prohibiting minors from drinking 
alcoholic beverages at drinking establishments or purchasing them at retail stores.  A possible 
strategy is to expand the use of the Minor Decoy Operations to target minors.  Similar 
programs nationwide, such as the “Cops in Shops” program, where law enforcement officers 
pose as clerks in retail stores to catch the sale of alcohol to minors, have been considered 
effective despite limited research.  
 
5.2.2 Traffic Enforcement - General 
5.2.2.1 Provide adequate police coverage for impaired driving enforcement 
COST = LOW EFFECTIVENESS = HIGH 
This strategy was rated low cost because it would 
not require additional funds from the DUII 
Working Group for increased staff.  Funds are 
needed to maintain a certain number of officers.   
 
This strategy was rated highly effective at 
reducing alcohol-involved crashes because while 
no clear research exists, most studies directly 
relate enforcement to crash reductions. Special 
approaches, however, may be required.   
 
The City of Portland has a designated Traffic Division at the Portland Police Bureau that 
works with all precincts to handle impaired driving occurrences. Although all law 
enforcement officers in all precincts know how to handle DUIIs, they often refer the 
occurrences to the Traffic Division. With limited staff, however, the Traffic Division may not 
be able to provide adequate coverage.  As previously mentioned, special units already exist in 
Portland to handle DUII cases.  Special DUII units in Texas with special decals on patrol 
vehicles and where officers are specially trained to handle impaired driving cases have 
resulted in a 25% decrease in alcohol-involved fatal crashes between 1997 and 2001 and a 
10% increase in the conviction rate of impaired drivers.  With limited staff and the 
responsibilities the Traffic Division has to also enforce traffic however, these special units 
could benefit from upper management support to promote additional coverage during 
impacted times when coverage is not sufficient.  This may require additional training of other 
police officers or hiring additional officers in the Traffic Division.  Nevertheless, support 
from upper management could increase the priority of impaired driving enforcement and 
work to further reduce alcohol-involved crashes, especially on nights and weekends. 
 
A briefing to the Portland Police Bureau may be one way of increasing police officers’ 
awareness, not just in the Traffic Division.  Senior management could increase awareness by 
communicating how DUII enforcement is an effective use of officers’ time and especially on 
how much DUIIs actually cost the city. This effort would require gathering detailed 
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information on DUIIs and presenting it in a manner that would make an impact on senior 
staff. The goal of this action is to start to build a coalition at the top that can effectuate a 
change in how DUIIs are processed.  In a study conducted by Johnson (2005), on how 
management influences officer traffic enforcement productivity, Officers were surveyed in 
the Cincinnati, Ohio metropolitan area to determine how management activities impacted 
officer performance. Officers at several agencies completed questionnaires on how they 
perceived expectations from management and the resulting training, arrests, and citations 
made. The study concluded by giving recommendations to police administrators, including 
clearly communicating expectations, ensure officers have capabilities to engage in traffic 
enforcement by providing officers with training , officers have the opportunity to engage in 
DUII enforcement, and make sure supervisors set an example and motivate officers by 
enforcing DUII (Johnson, 2005).  
 
5.2.2.2 Re-explore the possibility of using sobriety or pseudo-checkpoints and 
saturation patrols 
COST = MEDIUM EFFECTIVENESS = HIGH 
This strategy was rated medium cost because it 
additional funds may be needed to fund 
additional staff and set up media campaigns.  
 
This strategy was rated highly effective at 
reducing alcohol-involved crashes because while 
no clear research exists, most studies directly 
relate enforcement to crash reductions. Special 
approaches, however, may be required.   
 
Few opportunities exist for officers in Oregon other than through law enforcement to identify 
impaired drivers and start the DUII sanctioning and treatment process. The most common 
enforcement method is for officers to pull over suspected impaired drivers as part of their 
routine enforcement activity. One potential approach that is utilized frequently during 
holidays is sobriety checkpoint. In the literature, these have been demonstrated to be an 
effective means of reducing alcohol-involved crashes (reduction of 16-56% in alcohol-
involved crashes). Regionally coordinated efforts have been known to help take advantage of 
limited research and have been used in California with a 24% decrease in alcohol-involved 
injury crashes and 56% decrease in alcohol-involved fatal crashes. Unfortunately in Oregon, 
sobriety checkpoints are unconstitutional. One strategy to getting the benefit of checkpoints 
without violating the Oregon constitution is to either conduct high-visibility saturation 
patrols or an approach where all vehicles meeting the legal threshold for a traffic stop are 
pulled over. These events should be accompanied by significant media events and an 
arrangement to increase the ease at which arrested drivers could be processed. Several states 
have combated the time issue by utilizing special impaired driving enforcement unit (IDEU) 
vans that is sent to an incident or stationed at a command center, which is closer to where an 
officer is patrolling. This type of van has been used in Phoenix, Arizona and has resulted in a 
reduction of the processing time from 3 hours to 1 hour (United States, 1999).   It would be 





5.2.3 Traffic Enforcement - Specific 
5.2.3.1 Allow for immediate blood draw 
COST = LOW EFFECTIVENESS = LOW 
This strategy was rated low cost because it may 
not require DUII Working Group funds.   
 
This strategy was rated low on the effectiveness 
scale at reducing alcohol-involved crashes 
because it is primarily a special Oregon-problem 
and can be resolved through legal means.   
 
One of the primary concerns raised by enforcement personnel is the difficulty in obtaining an 
the results of a blood draw from an alcohol-involved crash patient at the hospital. When a 
patrolling law enforcement officer’s request to administer a breadth test is refused by a 
suspected impaired driver who is pulled over, the officer may choose to transport offenders 
to the hospital where they will be subject to a blood test. Law enforcement may also be 
involved where an accident occurred and the impaired driver is taken to the hospital for 
injury treatment. For law enforcement, the issue of concern regarding blood draw is how 
soon the blood draw can be taken. Current HIPAA statutes prevent hospital staff from 
releasing medical records or other patient reports to law enforcement personnel without the 
written consent of the patient, a subpoena, or as otherwise required by law. If a blood draw 
cannot be taken immediately after the offender consumed intoxicating substances, then the 
BAC level may be just too low to prosecute the offender. This makes a huge impact if the 
offender has had prior DUII convictions.   
 
HIPAA statutes also impact the chance of identifying potential impaired drivers. Law 
enforcement may not be involved in all blood draw instances. In many instances, patients 
admitted to the hospital are suspected by physicians at the hospital of alcohol intoxication or 
inappropriate drug usage. In these incidents, law enforcement officers are not involved. 
HIPAA statutes currently do not require physicians to deliver a blood sample with patient 
identifying information without the authorization of the patient or through some other legal 
process (ORS 676.260).  A legislative change is recommended to speed up the time 
necessary for a blood draw. If this cannot be achieved, an organized body could be set up to 
facilitate discussions between law enforcement and medical personnel. Members on this 
body may include representatives from law enforcement agencies and the Oregon Medical 
Association. The goal of these efforts is to reduce the time taken to test a suspected impaired 
driver.   
 
5.2.3.2 Train more police officers to become Drug Recognition Experts 
COST = MEDIUM EFFECTIVENESS = MEDIUM 
This strategy was rated medium cost because it 
may require funds for increased training.   
 
This strategy was rated medium on the 
effectiveness scale at reducing alcohol-involved 
crashes because it is relates to better processing 
rather than reducing the alcohol-involved 
crashes.    
 
Although no crash data analysis was completed due to inconsistent data, through discussions 
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with the DUII Working Group, it was recognized that driving and the use of controlled 
substances (e.g. drugs), especially in combination with alcohol, is on the rise.  Additional 
training for police officers and possibly also for servers is suggested as a possible way to 
account for the effects of intoxication from a controlled substance.  Training more officers to 
become Drug Recognition Experts could help.  Policy could also be developed to determine 
how to handle intoxication from both a controlled substance and alcohol.  
 
5.2.4 Prosecution - Administrative 
5.2.4.1 Decrease delays in processing of first time offenders  
COST = HIGH EFFECTIVENESS = MEDIUM 
This strategy was rated high cost because 
additional up front funds are needed to start new 
programs.    
 
This strategy was rated medium on the 
effectiveness scale at reducing alcohol-involved 
crashes because of limited research. However, 
the issue was identified as a concern by several 
members of the DUII Working Group.     
 
In the 1980’s, an arrested person spent the night in jail and was held until arraignment the 
following day. This is no longer the case. In extreme cases, the same person could be arrested 
two to three times the same night because they were not held. Part of this problem may be 
due to the lack of jail space for impaired drivers. Furthermore, once an impaired driver leaves 
the police department, it may be weeks before they can go to trial for the DUII offense. The 
lack of consequences precludes changes in impaired driving behavior (Krueger and Bloch, 
2006). The DUII Working Group identified a need to decrease delays in the processing of 
first time offenders.  Sources of delays included the time police officers spend at court during 
the prosecution of first time offenders, the limited number of attorneys available to handle 
the heavy case load of first time and repeat offenders, and the time before treatment starts for 
first time offenders.  Specific research was not available to propose possible strategies.   
However, some possible strategies could be hiring more prosecutors, increasing the 
efficiency of the paperwork completed.  The goal is speed up the processing of DUII 
offenders with immediate consequences to the offender. 
 
A primary concern brought up by the DUII Working Group is the need to shorten the amount 
of time required for police enforcement to process a DUII case. This is more of an issue for 
less dense and more spread out areas such as Clackamas County, where the average DUII 
case is processed in approximately four hours. In the City of Portland, the processing time is 
approximately 2 hours. The concern is not getting the offender to an intoxilizer for a 
chemical breath test, but in the transfer of the offender to the jail. The increased time reduces 
the BAC level of the offender as well as prevents the officer from spending time patrolling 
elsewhere. Furthermore, the time a law enforcement officer has to spend on a DUII case may 
be a disincentive for him/her to make any DUII arrests (NHTSA, 2003).  
 
Several states have combated the time issue by utilizing special impaired driving 
enforcement unit (IDEU) vans that is sent to an incident or stationed at a command center, 
which is closer to where an officer is patrolling. The latter is usually what is employed in a 
saturation patrol.  This type of van has been used in Phoenix, Arizona and has resulted in a 
82 
 
reduction of the processing time from 3 hours to 1 hour (United States, 1999).  Nevada law 
enforcement used the vans and found their processing time reduced from 2 hours to 1 hour or 
less (NHTSA, 2002).  To give this some perspective, the average time to process a DUII case 
(without the use of vans) is 45 minutes to 4 hours (NHTSA, 2003).  
 
5.2.5 Prosecution – Target Groups 
5.2.5.1 Engage the DUII Working Group to improve areas where deficiencies 
may exist in the juvenile system  
COST = LOW EFFECTIVENESS = MEDIUM 
This strategy was rated low cost because 
deficiencies would need to be first identified.     
 
This strategy was rated medium on the 
effectiveness scale at reducing alcohol-involved 
crashes because of the body of research for 
controlling youth access to alcohol (MLDA and 
zero tolerance laws) which have been shown to 
be effective. This effectiveness could be 
transferred to similar programs.   
 
The DUII Working Group identified a possible area of concern as a lack of strict penalties 
applied for minors in possession of alcohol.  Particularly, there is no penalty for minors with 
a MIP citation who fail to show up to court.  To target and prevent habitual drinking among 
the youth population, penalties must be applied to minors who fail to show up to court.  A 
possible strategy is to further explore the juvenile system to identify and then resolve 
deficiencies or close up gaps where minors are currently avoiding penalties.  Getting the 
parents of minors involved may be one possible strategy to explore.  Although the 
effectiveness of applying penalties are unknown, similar strategies, such as the minimum 
drinking age laws (MLDA) and zero tolerance laws have been shown to be effective in 
reducing alcohol-involved crashes of approximately 20%.  It is likely the effectiveness for 
resolving such deficiencies would result in similar decreases in alcohol-involved crashes 
among minors.  
 
5.2.5.2 Provide training or education to encourage judges to apply existing 
penalties for first time offenders.  
COST = LOW EFFECTIVENESS = LOW 
This strategy was rated low cost because money 
is not needed to address the barrier of more strict 
penalties.     
 
This strategy was rated low on the effectiveness 
scale at reducing alcohol-involved crashes 
because harsher penalties may not be needed.  
 
There is a perception among some members of the DUII Working group that penalties are 
not applied consistently or more severe enough to first time offenders.  DUII conviction 
remains on the individual’s driving record to ensure the record remains on file for the 
identification of a repeat offense.  It is recommended that through the efforts of the DUII 
Working Group, training or education be provided to encourage that judges consistently 
apply existing penalties for first time offenders.  Some argue that harsher penalties may not 
83 
 
be needed since some research shows that higher penalties do not significantly reduce 
alcohol-involved crashes. However, additional evaluation may be needed to determine how 
well court sanctions affect recidivism.  Effective evaluations depend on reliable and closely 
monitored record systems that are not readily available.  Oregon is not alone in this problem. 
 
5.2.5.3 Increase the use of ignition interlocks 
COST = MEDIUM EFFECTIVENESS = HIGH 
This strategy was rated medium cost because it 
is an improvement of a program currently in 
place.   
 
This strategy was rated highly effective at 
reducing alcohol-involved crashes because of the 
extensive body of research showing its 
effectiveness.    
 
Ignition interlocks are used in Portland for repeat offenders.  The devices ensure the driver of 
the vehicle is not impaired when driving an equipped vehicle. Research indicates ignition 
interlocks reduce traffic violations, and therefore the potential for an alcohol-involved crash, 
by up to 9.1%. Internationally, the reduction in alcohol-involved fatal crashes goes as high as 
65% among interlock users and 25% among all alcohol-involved fatal crashes.  Increased use 
of the ignition interlocks is therefore suggested as an effective strategy for reducing alcohol-
involved crashes.  
 
 
5.2.5.4 Implement special DUII camps or increase the use of house arrest or 
community service 
COST = HIGH EFFECTIVENESS = MEDIUM 
This strategy was rated high cost because a new 
program would have to be established, that may 
require a high upfront and annual program costs.  
This strategy was rated medium on the 
effectiveness scale at reducing alcohol-involved 
crashes because of the supervision that would be 
needed to make the program succeed.     
 
DUII camps and house arrest are two sanctioning programs that have been used to reduce the 
limited jail space taken up primarily by repeat offenders.  A DUII offender in Oregon must 
spend at least 48 hours in jail.  This jail time is higher for repeat offenders.  To free up jail 
space, DUII camps or DUII jails could be reintroduced.  The DUII camps would require high 
upfront and annual operating costs, but could work not only to free up jail space, but provide 
intensive supervised treatment for repeat offenders.  Programs that would cost less would 
include increasing the use of house arrest (electronic monitoring) or community service. Both 
would require supervision and therefore high annual operating costs.  However, the costs 
would be less than that for the DUII camp.  The community service program has an added 
benefit in that offenders may be able to pay for their treatment through community service. 






5.3.1.1 Increase the number of Alcohol and Drug Evaluation Specialists 
COST = HIGH EFFECTIVENESS = MEDIUM 
This strategy was rated high cost because of the 
additional staffing required.  
This strategy was rated medium on the 
effectiveness scale at reducing alcohol-involved 
crashes because although no research has been 
conducted on the effectiveness of increased 
number of supervisors, treatment programs are 
generally more effective because increased 
supervision typically leads to increased 
compliance.  
 
In Multnomah County, a person entering division will be required complete a treatment 
course.  County sponsored DUII Evaluators and Alcohol and Drug Evaluation Specialists 
(ADES) personnel work as the liaison between the abundant number of private treatment 
providers and the courts.  The DUII Working Group recognized a need to increase the 
number of evaluators and specialists due the number of individuals entering diversion.  The 
waiting list for individuals waiting to enter inpatient treatment was 4-6 months in the fiscal 
year 2006.  Additional staff could be effective in ensuring timely participation in treatment 
programs and compliance with diversion court requirements.  No research has been 
conducted on the effectiveness of liaisons between courts and treatment providers.  However, 
increased supervision typically leads to increased compliance.  Individuals may be treated in 
a timelier manner, the effectiveness of treatment may increase, and the potential for repeat 
impaired driving occurrences and therefore alcohol-involved crashes may decrease.  
 
5.3.1.2 Include treatment evaluators and specialists in the courthouse or in close 
proximity to facilitate communication with the client.  
COST = MEDIUM EFFECTIVENESS = MEDIUM 
This strategy was rated medium cost because of 
the evaluators are already in close proximity   
This strategy was rated medium on the 
effectiveness scale at reducing alcohol-involved 
crashes because no research has been 
conducted on the effectiveness proximity of 
evaluators to the courthouse or more efficient 
processing of paperwork.  However, efficient 
processing time is generally regarded as having 
a positive effect on the success of a program.   
 
The DUII Rehabilitation Program in Multnomah County is the liaison between the individual 
undergoing treatment and the courts.  It has been identified that clients need to report to the 
DUII Rehabilitation and Courthouse in a timely, not only physically but also with regards to 
the paperwork.  The DISP program, which is focused on repeat offenders, is already housed 
in the County Courthouse and has been shown to be effective in reducing recidivism.  The 
DUII Rehabilitation Program, which is estimated to have a potential to reduce recidivism by 
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48%, could also be moved closer to the courthouse to decrease delays in the system and 
improve the effectiveness of treatment.  Solutions may include moving the physical location 
of the program closer to the courthouse, but could also include exploring the coordinated 
effort between evaluators, specialists, judges and other adjudication staff include making 
phone calls on the next day, writing letters, and sending notices to DUII clients.  Decreasing 
delays in how treatment cases are processed is likely to result in successful treatments and 
reduced recidivism.  
 
5.3.1.3 Increase funding for DUII Rehabilitation Program treatment services 
COST = MEDIUM EFFECTIVENESS = MEDIUM 
This strategy was rated medium cost because of 
the need for funding to pay for treatment for 
qualified clients.  
This strategy was rated medium on the 
effectiveness scale at reducing alcohol-involved 
crashes because although no research has been 
conducted on the effectiveness of increased 
number of supervisors, treatment programs are 
generally more effective because increased 
supervision typically leads to increased 
compliance.  
 
The DUII Rehabilitation Program in Multnomah County, targeting first time offenders, 
identified a concern of clients displaying non-compliance with a treatment program due to 
the inability to pay for treatment.  Although programs are already in place to pay for 
treatment, additional funding could greatly increase the number of individuals who complete 
treatment and therefore increase the overall effectiveness of treatment programs.  No 
research has been done to show the effectiveness of providing funds for clients who are 
unable to pay for treatment. Funding sources may include the National Highway Traffic 
Safety Association (NHTSA) Grants through the Oregon Department of Transportation 
(ODOT).  New York has addressed their funding shortfalls by establishing itself as a 
foundation, which qualifies them for additional funds (Williams, M. D., Gunnels, M., Richie, 
S., Oct 2005).  These funding strategies could be further explored by the DUII Working 
Group.  
5.3.1.4 Increase funding for DISP treatment services 
COST = MEDIUM EFFECTIVENESS = HIGH 
This strategy was rated medium cost because of 
the need for funding to pay for treatment for 
qualified clients.  
This strategy was rated high on the effectiveness 
scale at reducing alcohol-involved crashes 
because although no research has been 
conducted on the effectiveness of increased 
number of supervisors, treatment programs are 
generally more effective because increased 
supervision typically leads to increased 
compliance.  Furthermore, the DISP program has 
been known to be effective in reducing recidivism 
among repeat offenders.  
 
The DUII Intensive Supervision Program, targeting repeat offenders, identified a concern of 
clients displaying non-compliance with a treatment program due to the inability to pay for 
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treatment.  Although programs are already in place to pay for treatment, additional funding 
could greatly increase the number of individuals who complete treatment and therefore 
increase the overall effectiveness of treatment programs.  No research has been done to show 
the effectiveness of providing funds for clients who are unable to pay for treatment.  Funding 
sources may include the National Highway Traffic Safety Association (NHTSA) Grants 
through the Oregon Department of Transportation (ODOT).  New York has addressed their 
funding shortfalls by establishing itself as a foundation, which qualifies them for additional 
funds (William, et al., 2005).  These funding strategies could be further explored by the DUII 
Working Group.  
5.3.1.5 Expand treatment to include strategies to target specific groups 
COST = LOW EFFECTIVENESS = LOW 
This strategy was rated low cost because of the 
need for funding to pay for treatment for qualified 
clients.  
This strategy was rated low on the effectiveness 
scale at reducing alcohol-involved crashes 
because although no research has been 
conducted on the effectiveness of increased 
number of supervisors, treatment programs are 
generally more effective because increased 
supervision typically leads to increased 
compliance.  
 
Analysis of crash data indicates that Hispanic and white male populations between ages 21-
30 and 36-45 are a significant target profile of persons fatally injured in an alcohol-involved 
crash.  DUII treatments could be expanded to include strategies for changing the drinking 
culture for these target groups.   No research or programs targeting specific impaired profiles 




5.4.1.1 Continue DUII Working Group efforts and build relationship with 
Governor’s Council on Alcohol and Drug Abuse Program 
COST = LOW EFFECTIVENESS = HIGH 
This strategy was rated low cost because little 
additional money is needed to sustain the DUII 
Working Group and build lasting relationships 
with other parties.  
This strategy was rated highly effective at 
reducing alcohol-involved crashes because 
although there is not research on the 
effectiveness of coordinated leadership per se on 
alcohol-involved crashes, it has been identified 
as  best practice.    
 
Leadership provided in DUII Committees and Systems is recognized as a best practice.  
Currently the efforts of the DUII Working Group have focused on the City of Portland and 
Multnomah County. However members from neighboring jurisdiction and from the state are 
active members of the DUII Working Group.  In addition, many of the possible strategies 
identified involve lobbying at the state level of could be efficiently be implemented through 
building a relationship with other parties such as the neighboring counties in the Portland 
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metropolitan area.   
 
5.4.2 Funding 
5.4.2.1 Pursue various funding resources 
COST = LOW EFFECTIVENESS = HIGH 
This strategy was rated low cost because little 
money is required to explore other funding 
options.   
This strategy was rated highly effective at 
reducing alcohol-involved crashes because 
although there is not research on the 
effectiveness of coordinated leadership per se on 
alcohol-involved crashes, it has been identified 
as  best practice.    
 
The majority of barriers identified by the DUII Working Group and observed through 
research on best practices indicate limited resources available to provide a fail proof system 
for combating the impaired driving issue.  Additional funding sources that may be explored 
include NHTSA, ODOT Safety, and OTREC (for research purposes.)   Other funding sources 
may include the drinking population.  The idea on placing an excise tax on beer and wine is 
an economic one of making the consumer pay the full social cost of producing, consuming 
alcoholic beverages, and therefore reducing the consequences of consuming alcohol (Cook 
and Moore, 1994).  A tax on beer and wine could be increased to pay for areas where 
deficiencies due to funding have been indicated as a barrier to the program’s success.  
Currently, only about 5% of all revenue generated from the beer and wine tax goes to mental 
health, alcoholism, and drug services (Oregon Liquor Control Commission, 2007-2).  
 
5.4.3 DUII Tracking System 
5.4.3.1 Create a consolidated data system  
COST = HIGH EFFECTIVENESS = MEDIUM 
This strategy was rated high cost because it 
would require a substantial amount of upfront 
costs to fund a comprehensive DUII tracking 
system.    
This strategy was rated medium on the 
effectiveness scale at reducing alcohol-involved 
crashes because although there is not research 
on the effectiveness of coordinated leadership 
per se on alcohol-involved crashes, it has been 
identified as  best practice.    
 
Currently, data on impaired driving comes from several sources. In putting together this 
report, one of the challenges was to make sense of what often seemed like conflicting data 
interpretations or differences in what was reported.  A single DUII tracking system include 
information by offender such as blood test results from hospitals, effectiveness of 
motivational interviews, treatment program success ratings, police records, and notes should 
be kept to provide for better service to the offender, serve as a wealth of information for 
persons involved in impaired driving such as law enforcement personnel, liquor control 
commission, researchers, and policymakers.  One issue that would have to be worked out is 




5.4.3.2 Keep a tracking system to record and archive bicycle near misses and 
actual collisions 
COST = LOW EFFECTIVENESS = LOW 
This strategy was rated low cost because it would 
pertain only to a select segment of the 
population. 
 
This strategy was rated low on the effectiveness 
scale at reducing alcohol-involved crashes 
because although there is not research on the 
effectiveness of coordinated leadership per se, 
but was identified by the DUII Working Group. 
 
Currently, limited alcohol-involved crash and incident data exists on pedestrians and 
bicyclists.  Although current crash data does include a field coding for pedestrians and 
bicyclists, it may not include information about whether or not the pedestrian or bicyclist was 
impaired.  Furthermore, the data may not reflect what actually occurs, since the majority of 
pedestrian and bicyclist involved incidents are not reported.  This limitation is more severe in 
Oregon since the majority of crash data are citizen reported.  If more incidents are reported, 
possibly with the support of bicycle and pedestrian advocate groups, and the current crash 
database can be modified to accommodate increased pedestrian and bicyclist oriented fields, 
then valid quantitative data can be produced to better understand and then communicate the 
personal risks of intoxication. 
 
Overall, more data needs to be collected on impaired bicycling and the occurrence of 
alcohol-involved crashes involving bicyclists. The bicycle community has already expressed 
concern over their personal safety.  Having research to support their claims would help to 
better determine an appropriate future course of action.  A tracking system for bicycle near 
misses and collisions would require an organization to be the keepers of the data. The same 
system could also keep track of pedestrian near misses or actual collisions.  This system 
would likely have to be kept by an organization such as ODOT to reduce the amount of 
citizen generated reports.  Regardless, the purpose of collecting these data are to assist in 
developing possible strategies to reduce the number of pedestrians hit by vehicles in an 
alcohol-involved crash.  
 
5.5 NAMEOCRACY 
As shown in the previous section, each identified possible strategy, a cost and effectiveness 
rank of low, medium, or high is assigned.  The effectiveness ranking is based on the potential 
to reduce alcohol-related (or to some extent intoxicant-related) crashes. Crash reduction 
percentages are based on best practice research results. To rank the potential strategies, a 
“nameocracy” effort was conducted.  This exercise and the results are presented in this 
chapter. The information in the previous chapter was presented to the working group in 
spreadsheet form. Each member was given dots indicting their 1st, 2nd, 3rd, and 4th priority 
strategy for funding. The effort was conducted on two separate meetings. The total points is 
reflective of the number of priority votes multiplied by a weight for each value. The detailed 




Based on the data, review of best practices, and stakeholder interviews a matrix was 
developed to assist the DUII Working Group in determining a suitable strategy for reducing 
the impact of driving under the influence of intoxicants (drugs and alcohol) in Multnomah 
County and the City of Portland.  Barriers and potential strategies are organized into three 
categories, prevention, enforcement and treatment categories.  These categories pertain to 
target opportunities prior to, during, and following an impaired driving incident.   
 
6.1 PRIORITIZED STRATEGIES 
The results of the analysis, literature review, and ranking by the DUII working group results 
in the following strategies being  recommended: 
• Re-explore possibility of using pseudo-checkpoints or saturation patrols coupled with 
intensive media coverage to raise awareness of DUI enforcement. 
• Obtain support from Portland Police Bureau upper management for increased 
enforcement, especially on nights and weekends. 
• For qualified low-income clients, increase funding available for treatment services. 
• Engage DUII working group to work with juvenile system to identify areas where the 
group can work to improve the current situation. 
• Work to find ways to increase funding for the highly successful DISP program to 
expand program services to help reduce chronic repeat offenders.  
• Work with court system to advocate for ways to enhance efficiency. 
• Provide alternative transportation options from drinking establishment for impaired 
drivers using programs such as RideOn Portland and-or increasing transit options. 
These efforts should be coupled with a strong, effective marketing campaign. 
• Deliver education campaigns in a more appealing manner (social marketing) 
particularly highlighting minors and other key groups.  
• Work to increase the use of ignition interlocks as sanctions. 
• Encourage consistent application of motivational interviews for hospital patients upon 
discharge. 
• Continue DUII Working Group efforts and build relationship with Governor's 
Council on Alcohol and Drug Abuse Program. 
 
 
6.2 NEXT STEPS 
The DUII Working Group should select a number of items for targeted efforts and help 
expand these ideas. The COP CSTSP should be encouraged to develop and write grants to 
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APPENDIX A GLOSSARY 
Administrative Per Se Laws - Laws which state that if a driver's blood alcohol 
concentration is in excess of a specific level (typically .10 percent), the State driver licensing 
agency may suspend the driver's license via administrative action which is independent of 
any court action related to a DUI charge (www.ncadd.com). 
Alcohol-related / Alcohol-involved – An event involving a motor vehicle driver, bicyclist, 
or pedestrian where there is evidence that alcohol was involved and tests were not necessarily 
conducted. 
Alcohol-related crash / Alcohol-involved crash – A crash where at least one driver or 
nonoccupant (pedestrian, pedalcyclist, or bicyclist) involved in the crash is determined to 
have had a blood alcohol concentration (BAC) of 0.01 gram per deciliter (g/dl) or higher 
(FARS, Williams, M. D., Gunnels, M., Richie, S, Oct 2005). This report will use the term, 
alcohol-involved.  
Blood Alcohol Concentration (BAC) - Alcohol concentration in the body, also referred to 
as blood alcohol content, blood alcohol level (BAL) or breath alcohol content. BAC can be 
measured either in blood or breath. The national BAC limit is 0.08 milligrams of alcohol per 
100 milliliters of blood. 
FARS definition - The BAC is measured as a percentage by weight of alcohol in the 
blood (grams/deciliter). A positive BAC level (0.01 g/dl and higher) indicates that 
alcohol was consumed by the person tested. A BAC level of 0.10 g/dl or more 
indicates that the person was intoxicated (FARS, 2006). 
Blood Alcohol Test - Any chemical test of breath, blood, urine or other bodily substance 
used to determine the concentration of alcohol in the blood (www.ncadd.com).  
Chronic drunk drivers – An NCAAD term, also known as Problem Drinkers or Persistent 
Drinking Driver, people with an underlying alcohol problem that interferes with their driving 
as well as other aspects of their life. 
Crash – Event that produces injury and/or property damage, involves a motor vehicle in 
transport, and occurs on a trafficway or while the vehicle is still in motion after running off 
the trafficway (FARS, 2006). 
Drinking driver – Any driver with a positive BAC level. 
Driving Under the Influence of Intoxicants (DUII) – (Oregon) The offense of driving 
while impaired or under the influence of an intoxicating liquor, also known as Driving 
While Intoxicated (DWI) and Driving Under the Influence (DUI).  
In this report, DUII will be used in place of DWI and DUI. Although some states include 
drugs and other substance abuse in DUII, the use of such substances will not be explored in 
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this report. However, it is noted because of the impact it may have in data interpretation.  
Drunk driving / Impaired driving - Driving with a BAC level exceeding a state’s per se 
level or while sufficiently impaired by alcohol to be guilty of DUII.  (Note: In some cases, 
impaired driving applies to any driver who is driving and is under the influence of alcohol. 
The amount of alcohol consumed by the individual is irrelevant.) 
Fatal Crash - A police-reported crash involving a motor vehicle in transport on a traffic way 
in which at least one person dies within 30 days of the crash (FARS, 2006). 
Illegal Per Se Laws - Laws which make it an offense to operate a motor vehicle with a 
specified amount of alcohol in the blood. In States having such laws the specified amount of 
BAC is .10 percent. Rebuttable evidence is not considered relevant, except that the test was 
improperly administered (www.ncadd.com). 
Presumptive Laws - Laws which state that if a specified level of alcohol is present in a 
driver's blood, the driver is presumed to have been driving under the influence or intoxicated. 
However, because the presumption is rebuttable, other evidence can be introduced by the 
defendant to disprove allegation (www.ncadd.com). 
Zero Tolerance Laws - Laws in support of allowing no measurable amount of alcohol in the 




APPENDIX B CRASH CODES 
 
Table 1: Descriptions of Driver Error Types 
 
Short Driver Error 
Description 
Long Driver Error Description 
A/TRAF-P  Walking, running, riding, etc., on pavement FACING traffic 
BASCRULE  Driving too fast for conditions (Not excessive speed) 
BTWN INT  Crossing between intersections 
CUT CORN  Cut corner on turn 
DIAGONAL  Crossing at intersection - diagonally 
DIS EMER  Disregarded siren or warning of emergency vehicle 
DIS OFCR  Disregarded police officer or flagman 
DIS POL  Disregarding Police (eluding) 
DIS RR  Disregarded RR signal, RR sign, or RR flagman 
DIS SGNL  Disregarded traffic signal 
DIS SIGN  Disregarded warning sign, flares or flashing amber 
F/MT SPD  Citation issued for “Failure to maintain reasonable speed” 
F/SLO MV  Failed to decrease speed for slower moving vehicle 
FAIL LN  Failed to maintain lane 
FAIL TRN  Failed to obey mandatory traffic turn signal, sign or lane 
markings 
FRM WRNG  Turned from wrong lane 
ILLEG U  U-turned illegally 
IMP BACK  Backing improperly (Not parking) 
IMP CHG  Improper change of traffic lanes 
IMP LGHT  Improper or no lights (vehicle in traffic) 
IMP STOP  Improperly stopped in traffic lane 
L IN TRF  Left turn in front of oncoming traffic 
LAYON RD  Standing or lying in roadway 
N/PAS ZN  Passing in “No Passing” zone 
NO DIM  Failed to dim lights (until 4/1/97) / Inattention (after 4/1/97) 
NO ROW  Did not have right-of -way 
NONE  No error 
OFF RD  Ran off road 
PAS CURV  Passing on a curve 
PAS INTR  Passing an intersection 
PAS TANG  Passing on straight road under unsafe conditions 
PAS TRAF  Passing in front of oncoming traffic 
PUSH MV  Pushing or working on vehicle in road or on shoulder 
RAN STOP  Disregarded stop sign or flashing red 
REAR-END  Failed to avoid stopped or parked vehicle ahead other than 
school bus 
SPEED  Excessive speed 
STRDL LN  Straddling or driving on wrong lanes 
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UNSF VEH  Driving unsafe vehicle (no other error apparent) 
W/TRAF-P  Walking, running, riding, etc., on shoulder WITH traffic 
WIDE TRN  Wide turn 
WK IN RD  Working in roadway or along shoulder 
WRNG WAY  Wrong way on one-way roadway (Vehicle is deliberately 
traveling on wrong side) 
WRNGSIDE  Driving on wrong side of road 
X N/SGNL  Crossing at intersection – no traffic signal present 
X W/SGNL  Crossing at intersection – traffic signal present 
 
Table 2: Descriptions of Collision Types 
 
Short Collision Type 
Description 
Long Collision Type Description 
ANGLE Angle 
BACKING Backing 




PARKING Parking Maneuver 
PED Pedestrian 
REAR-END Rear-End 
SS-MEET Sideswipe – Meeting 
SS- OVER Sideswipe - Overtaking 





APPENDIX C OREGON TRAFFIC SAFETY HISTORY 
 
Significant Laws in Oregon Traffic Safety, from Oregon Transportation Safety Division 
1931 
· As part of National Model Driver License law, driver licenses could be suspended upon 
conviction for DUII. 
1937 
· Law passed making driving under the influence of intoxicants a misdemeanor. Upon 
conviction, punishable by fine of up to $1,000 and a year in jail or both and license 
revocation for one year. 
1941 
· DUII law amended to permit police to test blood, breath and urine for alcohol content unless 
driver objected. BAC of 15% set as presumptive evidence. 
1965 
· Implied consent law on DUII passed but limited to breath test. 
1971 
· Blood alcohol level at which a driver is presumed to be under the influence of intoxicants 
lowered to .10 BAC. Illegal per se set at .15 BAC. 
· Judge required to order registration suspended or vehicle impounded in case of driving 
while suspended. 
1973 
· Minimum jail sentence for driving while suspended established. First: two days; second: 10 
days; third: 30 days. 
· To receive an occupational license, a convicted drunk driver must submit to a mental health 
exam and complete an alcohol education program. 
· Habitual offender act. Regular driver license suspended for 10 years for anyone convicted 
of three major traffic offenses or 20 moving violations in five years. 




· Driver improvement program established. 
1975 
· Driver license examination expanded to include knowledge and understanding of safe 
driving practices. 
1977 
· Motorcycle helmet law repealed, except for riders under age of 18. 
1979 
· State constitution amended to limit use of motor vehicle fuel and other taxes. Eliminated 
use for policing. 
1981 
· Motorcycle instruction program established. 
· Reimbursement for driver education increased form $50 to $100. 
· Diversion program for drivers arrested for first DUII in a 10-year period established. 
· Minimum damage increased from $200 to $400 for reporting a property damage crash. 
1983 
· Child safety seat or seat belt required for all children less than five years old. 
· BAC limit for DUII reduced from .10 to .08. 
· Responsibility for motorcycle rider education transferred to Oregon Traffic Safety 
Commission. 
· Juvenile denial law. Persons age 13-17 convicted of any crime, violation, or infraction 
involving possession, use, or abuse of alcohol or controlled substances have their driving 
privileges suspended or right to apply denied. 
· Administrative license suspension for failure of breath test or refusal to take breath test. 
(Implemented in 1984) 
· Alcohol treatment or education and additional penalties upon conviction of DUII. 
(Implemented in 1984) 
1985 
· Classified driver license system established. 
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· Occupant protection law strengthened. Children under one year must be in a child safety 
seat and children between one and 16 must be secured by a seat or belt. 
· Alcohol server education program established.  
1987 
· Bicycle rider education program established. 
· Issuance of hardship licenses restricted. 
· Ignition interlock system established as a pilot study. 
· Motorcycle helmet law re-established. Passed by a vote of the people after the Legislature’s 
referral placed the measure on the ballot. 
1989 
· Ignition interlock program extended. Oregon Traffic Safety Commission directed to 
evaluate diversion program. 
· Alcohol and drug policies and curriculum mandated for educational institutions. 
· Provisional driver license for persons under 18 established. Persons under 18 found to have 
consumed any alcohol subject to an implied consent suspension. 
· Pilot program started requiring police to mark the license plates of persons driving while 
suspended or revoked. 
· Commercial driver license program implemented. .04 BAC established as the standard of 
intoxication for commercial vehicle operators. (Implemented in 1990) 
· A safety belt law for all occupants. Passed by a vote of the people after an initiative placed 
the measure on the ballot. (Implemented in 1990) 
1991 
· A 0.00 BAC limit for implied consent suspension extended to include all persons under age 
21. 
· Driver license suspended for minors using false identification to purchase alcohol. 
· Boating under the influence of intoxicants established as a Class A misdemeanor. 
1993 
· Child restraint system for all children less than 40 pounds or less than four years required. 
· Minimum damage for reporting a property damage crash increased from $400 to $500. 
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· Tuition reimbursement for driver education increased to $150 and some restrictions were 
changed. 
· Bicycle helmets required for riders and passengers under age 16. 
1995 
· Health care providers permitted to report blood alcohol content of motor vehicle accident 
victims. 
· Suspension of driving privileges under implied consent law for failing blood test for BAC. 
· Police officers may request urine test when presence of controlled substances is suspected. 
· Photo radar speed enforcement demonstration project authorized in Beaverton and Portland. 
· Fines double in work zones. 
· Federal government repeals national maximum speed limit. 
1997 
· Accident reporting amount increased from $500 to $1,000. 
· Vehicle immobilization on vehicle owned or operated by person convicted of driving while 
suspended/revoked or second or subsequent DUII. 
· Motorcycle education (TEAM Oregon) required for all individuals under age 21 applying 
for motorcycle endorsement. 
· Vehicle impoundment for operation by person driving while suspended/revoked or DUII. 
· Sunset provision removed for urine testing of DUII's. 
· School Zones “When Children are Present” defined. 
· School Zones - doubles fines when signs posted. 
1999 
· Graduated Driver License program recommending completion of traffic safety education 
course and requiring a period of supervised driving before persons under 18 years receive 
non-restricted driver license. (Implemented in 2000) 
· Certain cities authorized to establish demonstration project using cameras to record drivers 
failing to obey traffic signals. 




· Establishes DUII as Class C felony when individual has three or more prior convictions. 
· Authorization for use of immobilization devices in addition to boot. 
2001 





APPENDIX D INTERVIEW QUESTIONS 
 
GENERAL DUII PROGRAM  
 
1. What are three general suggestions for improving the DUII program? When it comes 
to reducing / controlling DUII, what 3 big issues / 3 small issues do you feel most 
strongly about?  
 
2. How would you propose to resolve these issues?  
 
YOUR SPECIFIC INVOLVEMENT 
 
1. What DUII activity / program are you specifically involved in? 
 
2. In your words, what is the purpose of this activity / program? 
 
3. Describe the activity / program. What does it require? How does it work? 
 
4. If there was one story you would like to share from your experiences, what would it 
be? 
 
5. How effective is the activity / program in achieving your stated purpose? Successes? 
Failures? Barriers? (qualitative and quantitative answers) 
 
6. What performance metrics do you use for evaluation purposes? 
 
7. How does / could the program incorporate bicyclists / pedestrians? 
 
8. What types of information / resources / policies could make your program operate 
more efficiently or allow for more feasibility in accomplishing your goals?  
 
9. What other organizations / persons do you depend on for your activity / program to 
work? 
 





1. ODOT / Transportation Safety Division – Explain the DUII process from your 
perspective?   
 




3. Are bicyclists / pedestrians who are drunk stopped by the police? What are the 
handling procedures for bicycling / walking while intoxicated?  
 
4. What kinds of breath or other tests do drunk drivers take when first stopped by a 
police officer? 
 
5. How long is the diversion court / treatment process? 
 
6. How often do clients repeat the treatment program? 
 
7. What are the specific roles / responsibilities of the Drug Evaluators and Treatment 






APPENDIX D RESULTS OF FINAL VOTING 
 
 
Category Target Groups Identified Barrier or Problem Potential Solution 
NUMBER OF 













































Perception that likelihood of 
getting arrested or stopped by 
police officer is relatively low. Also, 
the highest BAC levels are 
occurring year round, not during 
the holiday period.  They are also 
not always occurring on 
weekends, despite more who drink 
on the weekend. 
Re-explore 
possibility of using 
pseudo-checkpoints 
to draw in more 
impaired drivers or 
saturation patrols to 
speed up 
processing.  These 














Adequate police coverage citywide 
is needed. Increase priority of 
impaired driving enforcement 
through out Portland Police 
Bureau. 




especially on nights 
and weekends, 
increase training for 
all police officers, 
increase staffing at 
the Traffic Division  







Many clients unable to adequately 
pay for treatment services 
For qualified clients, 
increase funding for 
treatment services 
4 3 3 
0 31 
Prosecution - 
Target Group Youth 
Lack of penalties for minors in 
possession of alcohol  
Engage DUII 
working group to 
work with juvenile 
system to increase 
effectiveness of 
program 







Low-income offenders have 
trouble paying for treatment in the 
highly-effective DISP Program 
Increase funding for 
the DISP program to 
expand program 
services  








Delays in processing first-time 
offenders lengthen the time 
needed by all participants, 




prosecutors, start a 
night court, increase 
the efficiency of the 
paperwork 
completed, or 
require the start of a 
treatment program 
prior to court hearing 




Alternative transportation options 
are not readily available to 
impaired persons or are not used 
(i.e. most transit service is not 




programs such as 
Ride On Portland 
and promote its use 
among the drinking 





0 1 2 
6 13 
Education / Media 
- Specific; 
Funding 
Youth Lack of adequate funding for youth education programs.   





3 0 0 
1 13 
Education / Media 
- Specific Youth 
Data analysis indicates that the 
Hispanic and white male 
populations between ages 21-30 
and 36-45 are a significant target 
profile of persons fatally injured in 
a alcohol involved crash. 
Deliver education 
campaigns in a more 
appealing manner 
integrated within the 
existing system. 
New research on 
media-specific 
applications 
indicates this may 
be promising 
approach 






Repeat offenders still drive even 
when their licenses have been 
suspended or revoked. 
Increase the use of 
ignition interlocks. 
Possible explore the 







0 2 3 
0 12 
Medical Care General 
Missed opportunity in education at 
trauma hospitals for alcohol-







upon discharge and 
follow up. 
0 3 0 
1 10 
Leadership General 
Statewide and regional or citywide 
leadership through establishment 
of coalitions needed 
Continue DUII 
Working Group 
efforts and build 
relationship with 
Governor's Council 
on Alcohol and Drug 
Abuse Program 




Lack of resources (and or officers) 
to properly enforce alcohol 
permitted locations and servers 
Increase efforts to 
lobby for additional 
funds by increase 
beer and wine tax 
(or equivalent) to 
generate funds for 







Resources Youth Minors access to alcohol 
OLCC Minor Decoy 
Operations could be 
expanded, 
consequences may 
not be strict enough 
to be effective 
0 0 1 
0 2 
Funding General Resources for all parties involved 












Additional training and legislative 
action is needed to account for the 
effects of intoxication from a 
controlled substance. Possible 
increasing trend of other 
substances being the prime 
intoxicant. 
Train more police 
officers to become 
Drug Recognition 
Experts. Determine 
new policy to 
determine how to 
handle intoxication 
from both alcohol 
and a controlled 
substance.  
0 0 0 
1 1 
 
